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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Overview of project financing
The term "project financing" has been used in various meanings describing the 
financing of any project through any funding sources and through any risk 
assumption pattern. In the field of international development aid, for example, 
project financing means lending for a specific project in which the lenders have 
a direct and unlimited recourse to a corporate or governmental borrower. Thus, 
the technical or economic success or failure of the project is important, but not 
decisive for the lenders, because they have access to the borrower's non-project 
assets and revenues which can be used for the repayment of the loan. 1 In the 
field of commercial banking, however, the terms "project financing" and 
"project lending" have become commonly known by definition as lending to 
a project (typically to a sole purpose project company) in which the lender 
expects to be repaid principally from the cash flow generated by the operation 
of a particular self-liquidating project. The sole collateral for the loan are the
revenues and assets of the project, except for limited recourse to the project
sponsors, i.e. equity owners of the project or other parties supporting it.2 In
other words, project financing means finance which is raised on a limited or
non-recourse basis where debt servicing and repayment largely or 
solely depend on the project's cash flow.
In the context of project financing, the term "project" refers to the 
process of planning, constructing and operating of an income-producing 
economic unit. Typically, various project financing techniques have been 
used to finance e.g. mines, pipelines, telecommunication networks, power 
plants, mineral processing plants, and other industrial enterprises. During 
the course of privatization in recent years, the applications of project financing 
have become more and more common in financing large-scale infrastructure 
projects like bridges, tunnels, railroads and highways.3
International project financing arrangements usually involve the 
establishment of an independent legal entity by the project's sponsors in 
the
1 Rendell and Niehuss, International Project Finance, in International Financial Law, 31 
(R.Rendell ed., 2nd ed. 1983); Heinrich Harries, The Contract Law of Project Financing, in 
The Law of International Trade Finance, Volume 6, 346 (Norbert Horn ed. 1989). 
2 Harries, 346.
3 See e.g. Gordon McKechnie, Project Finance (limited Recourse Finance), in International 
Finance and Investment, 271 (Brian Terry ed. 1987).; Hans van Houtte, The Law of 
International Trade, 295 (1995) 
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project's host country. The legal form of the entity is often a limited liability 
company or a company limited by shares for risk limitation and risk-sharing 
purposes among the participants of the project. This project company owns 
the project assets and is charged with the construction and operation of the 
project. In project financing arrangements, the project company is liable to 
the project lenders for the repayment of the loans. From the project sponsors' 
perspective, the project company serves as a risk limitation unit between them 
and the project lenders.4
Project financing arrangements often make the financing of large-scale 
infrastructure projects commercially feasible by minimizing the risks which 
the parties involved must bear. Typical risk groups frequently existing in 
almost all international projects are completion risks, operation risks, market 
risks and political risks.5 The objective in the project financing arrangements 
is the transfering, allocating and sharing of risks among the various parties in 
a project, e.g. the project company's shareholders, contractors, equipment 
suppliers, energy and raw material suppliers, buyers of the project's end 
product, and project lenders. As a result, the risk level of each party should be 
financially reasonable in comparison with the future benefits to be achieved 
by the implementation and operation of the project.6
The minimizing of project risks by transfering, allocating and sharing 
them between the parties of a project can be achieved by contractual 
arrangements, which are often very complicated. These contractual arrange-
ments include special loan agreement provisions, various types of loan 
guarantees, long-term sales and purchase obligations, and other basically 
legal instruments allocating rights and obligations between the parties. As the 
large-scale investment projects financed by project financing are often crucial 
for the project's host country, it is justifiable to say that project financing 
represents an essentially legal solution to some of the major problems in 
financing
4 See McKechnie, 270 and 272; Harries, 347; Philip R Wood, Law and Practice of International 
Finance: Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 3 (1995). 
5 Harries, 348-350. 
6 Peter K Nevitt and Frank Fabozzi, Project Finance, 255 et seq. (6th edition 1995); Stewart 
E. Rauner, Project Finance: A Risk Spreading Approach to the Commercial Financing of 
Economic Development, 145 Harvard International Law Journal. Vol. 24 (1983); John Teolis, 
Issues in Project Finance, in Economic Development, Foreign Investment and the Law, 198 
(1996). 
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economic development.7
1.2. The basic structure of project financing arrangements
There is no uniform model for project financing arrangements. Each project 
financing is structured on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the specific 
needs of the project. However, the basic structure of project financing typically 
contains the elements set out in the following example:8
1) A single purpose project company (typically a limited liability company 
or a company limited by shares) is formed in the project's host country to 
build and operate a project. The shares in the project company are owned 
by the project sponsors who enter into a shareholders' or joint venture 
agreement with each other, governing their rights and duties as 
shareholders. The sponsors invest a certain amount of capital in the project 
company by way of equity subscriptions and/or subordinated debt.
2) In case of a major project, the government of the project's host country 
grants a concession to the project company to build and operate the 
project. 
3) Project contracts are entered into between the project company and the 
parties interested in the project. By entering into a construction contract, 
a contractor agrees to construct the project. The contractor's obligations 
are frequently bonded by surety companies or banks. The project sponsors 
may give a completion guarantee to the project company, guaranteeing 
that completion will take place at a certain date. There may also be 
equipment supply contracts whereby manufacturers agree to supply the 
equipment for the project. Moreover, energy and/or raw materials supply 
contracts are entered into between the project company and the suppliers. 
Finally, a long-term sales and purchase agreements may be entered into 
between the project company and the purchasers. Here, the purchasers 
(who often may be project sponsors) agree to buy all the project's 
production, or a certain portion of it. 
7 Rauner, 145. 
8 This example is based on the description in Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and 
State Loan, 3 and 4. 
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4) A syndicate of banks enters into a credit agreement (loan agreement) 
to finance the construction of the project. The borrowing entity is the 
project company. The project company grants the project lenders the 
maximum security available over the project assets. Before the 
disbursement of the loan, the project lenders require, as a conditions 
precedent, that all contractual arrangements and material authorizations 
necessary for the construction, operation and debt service of the project 
are legally binding and enforceable. There may be several classes of 
lending banks (project lenders), e.g. international banks lending foreign 
currency; local banks lending domestic currency for local costs; national 
export credit agencies lending or guaranteeing credits to finance suppliers 
of domestic equipment to the project; international agencies lending or 
guaranteeing development credits (World Bank, Asian Development 
Bank, African Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development). For ensuring their common interests as to debt repayment, 
there is frequently an intercreditor agreement between the project lenders. 
5) After completion of the project, the debt is repaid to the banks out of 
the sale's proceeds of the project's product, gained during the operational 
period of the project. The debt repayment period may yield even five to 
thirty. 
1.3. Project loan agreements and the choice of law and forum
The parties to an international project financing can choose the law governing 
at least the major part of their contractual relationship. The focus in this thesis 
being on the contractual risk minimization techniques available to the project 
lenders, the following discussion is intended to highlight the main 
considerations for the choice of law and the forum from the project lenders' 
perspective. The traditional rule in international financing is that private 
lenders prefer their loan agreements to be governed by their own law or some 
other "external law", i.e. a law other than that of the borrower's country. This 
approach, however, is not always applicable in project financing. 9
9 See Harries, 352 and 353; Kimmo Mettälä, Governing Law Clauses of Loan Agreements in 
International Project Financing, The International Lawyer Vol. 20, 242 (1986). 
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Private lenders often choose their loan agreements to be governed by the 
laws of New York and England, which in many cases are also the law of the 
lender's home country. The reason for choosing an external law is often 
threefold. Firstly, the choice of an external law may be intended to offer . 
insulation against adverse changes in the legislation of the borrower's home 
country (protection against legislative or political risk). Secondly, an external 
law with sufficiently developed case law and legal praxis may provide 
predictability concerning the outcome of the possible litigation. Thirdly, the 
choice of a law unrelated to the parties may serve as a compromise solution 10.  
However, taking into consideration the lender's interests, there are aspects 
which may make it beneficial to link the governing law of the loan agreement 
with the enforcing forum.
As to the choice of forum, a lender seeking to protect his interests should 
examine the enforceability of a judgment given by the forum. Since the 
judgment is useless if it cannot be effectively enforced, lenders should seek a 
forum in a jurisdiction where the borrower has assets, or attempt to find a 
forum whose judgment is enforceable in that jurisdiction.11
In project financing, the borrower typically is a project company, 
incorporated in the project's host country in which the assets necessary for the 
operation of the project - mainly consisting of real property, facilities, 
equipment and inventory owned by the project company - are located. As to 
these assets, the only efficient enforcement mechanism available for the 
project lender might be to bring a suit in a forum of the project's host 
country.12 Consequently, as regards the choice of law applicable to the project 
loan agreement and related security agreements, there are conveniences in 
choosing the law of the project's host country whose courts are most likely to 
be called upon to enforce the agreements (law of enforcing forum).13 The law 
of the place of incorporation of the borrowing project company governs its 
capacity to enter into contracts, its organization, its liquidation and, subject to 
various exceptations, its insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings.14 Security 
interests,
10 Mettälä, 242 and 243. 
11  Id. 237. 
12  Id. 242. 
13  Philip Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 1st Ed., 4 (1980) 
14  Harries, 352 and 353. 
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like mortgages and charges over the borrowing project company's real 
property, facilities and inventory, must be established under the local law (lex
rei sitae). The local law also provides the legal framework for enforcing the 
security interest.15 In addition, the inherent difficulties and costs involved in 
proving the contents of foreign law, applicable to the project loan agreement, 
may be arguments leading the project lenders to consider the choice of the law 
of the enforcing forum as the governing law of the project loan agreement. 
Finally, there may be instances where either public policy or mandatory rules 
of the enforcing forum may lead to application of local law, regardless of a 
choice of other governing law in the project loan agreement.16
As a conclusion, when considering the choice of the governing law of the 
project loan agreement, the choice should go, in the first place, to the law 
which is most suitable for enforcement of the project loan agreement in court 
or in a bankruptcy proceeding of the project company. Therefore, the law of 
the project's host country, i.e. the law of the place of incorporation of the 
project company and the place of location of major tangible assets, should be 
considered first.17
1.4. Aims, scope, limitations and structure of the study
The purpose of this study is to describe the main characteristics of 
international project financing, to identify the contractually-manageable 
factors determining the riskiness of the project lender's claim on a project 
company, and to examine the functions of the project lender's contractual risk 
minimization techniques.18
15 Mettälä, 242. 
16 Id.
17 Harries, 352. 
18 This study is also meant for serving as an introduction to the comprehensive analysis of 
legal transaction related objectives and means in creditor's overall credit risk minimization 
process. The present study is drawn up in connection with the author's licentiate thesis "The 
Legal Transaction Related Objectives and Means of Credit Risk Minimization in Project 
Financing and Cash Flow-Based Credit Financing ", in which the risks and conflicts 
determining the credit risk and the functions of various legal means for managing them are 
more thoroughly dealt with. The research mentioned above is one part of the research project 
of the Academy of Finland, "Modernization of Property Law in the Finnish Society after the 
Bank Crisis ". In Finland, the importance of secured credit financing (asset-based financing) 
has been traditionally strong. However, in many fields the business activities of Finnish 
companies tend 
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The essence of project financing is mainly a clear, complete and realistic 
analysis of the risks of a particular project, combined with an effort to manage 
the identified risks by transfering, allocating, and sharing the risks among the 
various parties.19 The risk management may appear to be primarily a financial 
phenomenon. However, it can be argued that it is essentially a legal 
phenomenon, since the level of risk bearing of the project's participants is 
dependent on the underlying contractual network of the project, in which the 
project risks are distributed by establishing risk-related rights and obligations 
among the project's participants.20
Legal documents of international project financing arrangements are 
prepared on a case-by-case basis and drafted to meet the requirements of the 
particular project in question. Each individual project has its own 
characteristics and involves a unique set of risks and conflicting interests 
among the parties. Accordingly, there are no standard structures or forms, no 
standard contracts, no general rules or conditions for project financing. 
Moreover, there are no uniform laws for international project financing. 21
However, there are some basic concepts, basic legal instruments and 
clauses which are frequently used and characteristic in project financing 
arrangements. In this study, the focus is on legal risk minimizing instruments 
and arrangements, which may be used for project lenders' protection in almost 
all cash-producing projects, whatever their nature may be. The legal 
arrangements examined in thesis are assumed to be made between private 
parties.
to be increasingly based on the exploitation of well educated labour force, innovations, 
intellectual property rights and high technology. Therefore, the market value of the companies' 
movable or immovable assets less frequently forms a solid base for secured financing of 
investments. As a result, the credit financing of Finnish companies is transforming to be 
increasingly "cash flow-oriented", i.e. the credit financing transactions are principally based 
on the predicted cash flows of the borrowing companies. As the security interests to 
companies' movable or immovable objects are gradually loosing their traditional role as legal 
means of minimizing credit risks, the importance of other types of legal means is gradually 
increasing. The principles of the comprehensive approach for the use of various legal credit 
risk minimization techniques laid down in this study are generally applicable to the cash 
flow-based credit financing. 
19 Harries, 350. 
20 Rauner, 156.  
21 See Harries, 350. 
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The initiators of project financing arrangements are the project sponsors. 
In this study it is assumed that project sponsors want to implement the project 
through a sole purpose limited liability company or a company limited by 
shares (herein referred to as a project company) the incorporation or 
establishment of which is subject to the company law of the project's host 
country, i.e. the country in which the project is located and carried out. 
Moreover, the project company is assumed to be the borrower, and the project 
loan is assumed to be made in the form of a term loan agreement. From this 
basis it is possible to identify four essential areas of legal relationships 
between private parties which are of special importance for project lenders:22
a) relations between the project company, the project company's 
shareholders  or sponsors  and the commercial project  lenders, 
determined by the legal instruments of actual financing 
arrangements,i.e. a project loan agreement, security agreements and 
guarantee documents; 
b) relations between the project company and the buyers of its end- 
product, determined ideally by long-term sales agreements; 
c) relations between the project company and its energy and/or raw- 
material suppliers, determined by the supply agreements; and 
d) relations between the project lenders, determined by the inter-creditor 
agreements. 
The legal relationships of a project related to the governmental authorities of a 
project's host country or other public entities are excluded from the scope of 
this thesis.
The purpose of this study is to describe the characteristics of international 
project financing and to examine the project lenders' contractual risk 
minimizing techniques which can be used within the fields of contractual 
relationships as mentioned above. In these relationships the contracting parties 
agree to transfer or share certain project risks by establishing rights and 
obligations which, directly or indirectly, to a certain extent ensure the debt 
repayment of the borrowing project company. Moreover, in a debtor-creditor 
relationship between a project company and a project lender, property rights 
are created by establishing security interests on project assets. Accordingly, the 
focus on legal issues is mainly related to the law of obligation and the law of
22 The list of the relationships is based on the division of main legal fields in project financing in 
Harries, 350. 
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property. In order to keep this study within reasonable bounds, the legal issues 
essentially related to other fields of law are just mentioned or dealt with very 
briefly.
After the disbursement of the project loan amounts, the relationship 
between the project lender(s) and the borrowing project company is 
characterized by the project company's obligation to repay the principal, the 
interest and the possible fees. Accordingly, the main objective of the project 
loan agreement, and the related contractual network of a project financing 
arrangement, is to ensure that those amounts are paid to the project lender(s) 
regardles of the risks which may materialize.
As a basis for examining the functions of the various contractual risk 
minimization techniques of project lenders, the aim of this thesis is to identify 
the contractually manageable factors determining the riskiness of the project 
lenders' claim on the project company. For the purposes of this study, the main 
factors are identified as 1) the project lender's recourse to third parties, 2) the 
project lender's priority right to project assets, 3) the project lender's right to 
decide about the acceleration of the project loan, 4) the project lender's right to 
supervise and control the operations of the borrowing project company and the 
project assets, and 5) the co-operation among the project lenders and other 
creditors in using their remedies against the borrowing project company. 
These factors form the conceptual framework within which contractual means, 
ensuring the repayment of the project loan, can be categorized and examined, 
and within which their functions can be analyzed. This kind of approach should 
help to locate, to analyze and to compare the legal instruments according to 
their purpose and objective in the context of a project lender's overall credit 
risk minimization. It should also make it possible to view some aspects of the 
weight and interplay of each category as parts of the whole.
The materialization of project risks jeopardizes the ability of a project 
company to repay the project loans and may cause the insolvency of the project 
company. In the case of a project company's insolvency there are certain 
obvious reaction alternatives for project lender(s), depending on the present 
financial situation of the project company and the legal instruments which are 
used in project financing arrangement for lenders' protection. The conceivable 
reaction alternatives include:
1) re-scheduling and re-structuring of the project loans; 
2) supporting the project company with additional loans, in order to make 
its operation capable of generating sufficient cash flow for debt 
repayment; 
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3) recourse to third parties under the guarantees and other debt 
repayment securing obligations; 
4) liquidation of the project company, and the realization of project 
assets by enforcement; and 
5) take-over of a project for the purpose of subsequently selling it as a 
going concern. 
Being oversimplified and overlapping, the above mentioned list of possible 
reaction alternatives of project lenders is not exhaustive. However, it is in 
these situations, following the choice of the reaction alternatives, in which the 
rationality and effectiviness of the contractual risk minimization 
arrangements for the lender's protection are tested. Accordingly, the aim of 
this study is also to observe the functions of contractual risk minimization 
arrangements of project financing in the light of a project lender's reaction 
alternatives in a project company's insolvency.
In this study, chapter 2 traces the origins of project financing and serves 
as an introduction to the basic concepts of limited recourse, non-recourse and 
limited liability in the context of project financing. In chapter 3, the definition 
of project financing is dealt with as it is established in the meaning of a 
specialized field of international commercial banking. Chapter 4 deals with 
the sponsoring companies' economic incentives and legal reasons for seeking 
project financing. Incentives from the project lenders' point of view are also 
viewed. Chapter 5 describes the phases of the implementation of a project, the 
main categories of project risks, and the basic principles of risk management 
and contractually manageable factors determining the project lenders' credit 
risk as a basis for the next chapters. The various types of debt repayment 
securing third party undertakings, with special regard to their functions as 
risk-transferring and risk-allocating devices, are discussed in chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 deals with project lenders' priority right to project assets and 
examines the meaning of security arrangements in project financing. Chapter 
8 is dedicated to examining the issues related to the acceleration of a project 
loan. Various types of covenants in project loan agreements, for the purpose 
of controlling and restricting the transactions and operations of the borrowing 
project company, are dealt with in chapter 9. In chapter 10 the focus is on the 
inter-creditor agreements which lay the principles for co-operation between 
the project lenders. Finally, in chapter 11, some conclusions are drawn as to 
the role of contracts in project financing arrangements and the meaning of 
achieving various credit risk minimization objectives.
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2. THE ORIGINS OF PROJECT FINANCING
The term "project financing" may be relatively new, but the financing method 
itself is probably as old as commercial lending activities. Wherever big 
amounts of capital and high risks have been involved in a specific business 
project, the parties involved have been looking for a way to limit and share 
their risks. The economic and legal environment in which the sponsors and 
lenders of projects operate have naturally changed over the years, but the 
fundamental objectives and problems have remained the same.
It can be argued that the history of project financing is in essence the 
same as the history of a limited or non-recourse concept. The concept of a 
lender looking principally to the proceeds, or to the cash flow generated by a 
specific project to pay the debt, was recognized as early as in the commercial 
code of classical Athens. The Greek bottomry loan (nautikon danaion) was 
only repayable from the proceeds of the sale of a cargo. If the ship carrying 
cargo was lost at sea, the loan was not repayable.23 Accordingly, the Greek 
bottomry loan was made on a non-recourse basis, i.e. the lender had no 
recourse to the assets of the borrower, except to the cargo. The Greek 
bottomry loan was essentially based on the idea of surrogation. The lender 
was entitled to whatever was bought with the money he had lent to the 
borrower. Thus, the merchandise was regarded to be pledged to him. If the 
goods were lost during the sea journey, the lender had lost the object which 
the liability of the borrower was attached to. As a consequence, his claim for 
repayment also fell away.24
The idea of the Greek bottomry loan was later adopted in Roman law in 
the form of fenus nauticum (sea loan). In classical times, the Greek custom 
served as a kind of common law for all the Mediterranean nations involved in 
overseas trade. Roman practise, too, followed it very closely.25 Like the 
Greek nautikon danaion, the Roman fenus nauticum was a loan of money 
given to a merchant involved in overseas trade and lacking the capital to buy 
the merchandise and ship it solely at his own risk. Usually, the loan was given 
for the round-trip voyage. At the port of departure, the merchant would use 
the
23 McKechnie, 270. 
24 Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
tradition, 183(1996). 
25 Id. 183. 
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money to buy articles suitable for export. He would then use the export 
proceeds to purchase import articles.26
Sea voyages on the Mediterranean were dangerous in Greek and Roman 
times, involving high risks because of storms and pirates. The Greek nautikon
danaion and the Roman fenus nauticum can be seen as early examples of a 
lender expressly assuming project risks, i.e. the capital was given by a lender 
to be used to carry out a certain project, not only being at the risk of the 
borrower, but also at the risk of the lender. Thus, there was an element of 
equity risk in these financings. Since the loan of money had to be repaid only 
if the ship arrived safely in port with the cargo on board, the lender, too, took 
part in bearing the risk of a project failure27 These financings also involved a 
certain element of marine insurance, which the merchants of those days were 
looking for. If the risks were materialized and the ship carrying the cargo was 
lost at sea, the loss of the amount of the loan was born by the lender. Because 
of the high risk the lender had to bear, high interest rates were charged as 
premiums from the borrowing merchants.28 In order to ensure their returns, 
the lenders, of course, had to spread their risk by diversifying their loan 
portfolio and claims to a number of borrowing merchants conducting 
overseas trade. In this respect, one could say that there is nothing new under 
the sun.
During the following centuries, more applications for using a limited 
recourse concept (or a limited liability concept from the borrower's 
perspective) and a project financing approach were developed to finance 
business activities involving high risks. In the Middle Ages and early colonial 
times, overseas investments, trade and ship building were largely supported 
by financing involving project risk.29 In the period of expansion of trade and 
industry in the nineteenth century, one of the key ideas involved in the 
development of business entities was the creation of a limited liability 
company?30 Among the most important underlying incentives for the creation 
of the limited liability company form was the social objective of encouraging
26 Id. 182. 
27 Id. 182; Taco Th van der Mast and JP Morgan, Ship Finance, in Project Lending 37 (TH 
Donaldson ed. 1992). 
28 Zimmermann, 182. 
29 Harries, 347. 
30 McKechnie, 270. 
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risky business investments by preventing the shareholders of a company from 
suffering a loss exceeding their investment in the company.31 The basic 
premise of the limited liability company was (and still is) the limitation of 
recourse: a creditor to a limited liability company could not proceed against 
the assets of its shareholders in order to recover his claim, unless the 
shareholder had entered into a contract or a guarantee in effect permitting him 
to do so.32 As a matter of fact, number of loans without substantial 
shareholder guarantees (or other third party guarantees) which, over the years, 
have been made to single limited liability project companies, have been de 
facto project financings, whether or not they have been seen as such by the 
bankers involved. As regards limiting of the project lender's recourse to a 
specific project, the establishment of a limited liability company charged with 
the construction and operation of the project, and being liable for repayment 
of the project debt, has generally remained the most satisfactory means of 
fulfilling this purpose.33
31 See Timo Rapakko, Corporate Control and Parent Firm's Liability for Their Controlled 
Foreign Subsidiaries: A Study on The Regulation of Corporate Concuct, 25 (1987). 
32 McKechnie, 270 
33 Id.
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3. DEFINITIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PROJECT 
FINANCING
3.1. Definitions
One of the most "official" definition of project financing has been given in the 
US by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), for accounting 
purposes. It reads as follows:
"(Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 47: Disclosure of 
long term obligations. March 1981). Project financing arrangement. The 
financing of a major capital project in which the lender looks principally 
to the cash flows and earnings of the project as the source of funds for 
repayment and to the assets of the project as collateral for the loan. The 
general credit of the project is usually not a significant factor, either 
because the entity is a corporation without other assets or because the 
financing is without direct recourse to the owner(s) of the entity.
The Export-Import Bank of the United States has adopted, from its own point 
of view, a somewhat different wording in defining project financing:34
"The term 'Project Finance' refers to the financing of projects that are 
dependent on the project cash flows for repayment as defined by the 
contractual relationships within each project. These projects do not rely 
on the typical export credit agency security package which has recourse 
to a foreign government, financial institution or established corporation 
to meet a reasonable assurance of repayment criteria. By their very 
nature, projects rely for successful completion on a large number of 
integrated contractual arrangements."
In his book Project Finance Graham D. Vinter, focusing on legal issues of 
project financing, prefers the following definition:
"... project finance is financing the development or exploitation of a right,
natural recourse or other asset where the bulk of the financing is not to be 
provided by any form of share capital and is to be of revenues produced 
by the project in question”. 35
These examples show that although there is no strict definition of "project 
financing", the concept itself is well established. The essence of project
34 Jukka Leskinen, Projektirahoituksesta, in Projektirahoitus. Sopimusten verkostuminen 16 
(Turun yliopiston oikeustieteellisen tiedekunnan julkaisuja 1996). 
35 Graham D. Vinter, Project Finance, xxvii (1995). 
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financing is its focus on the project which is being financed. The lender looks, 
wholly or mainly, to the project as the source of repayment; its cash flows and 
assets, where appropriate, are dedicated to service the project loan.
3.2. Categories - dependence on project and its cash flow
To illustrate the nature of project financing, categories can be made according 
to the dependence of the debt repayment on the success or failure of the project 
in generating sufficient cash flow. In the following discussion, it is assumed 
that the borrower is a newly established project company without credit history.
In pure project financing the  project  loan  is  the  sole  source  of  credit  
finance for the project, and is repaid only from the cash flows and the assets of 
the project company.36 As to the debt repayment, pure project financing is 
equivalent to the concept of non-recourse financing. Completely non-recourse 
financings, however, in which the lenders look exclusively to the cash flow and 
the assets of the project, and in which they have no other form of external 
credit support for the debt repayment, are relatively rare.37
The more typical project financing falls in the category of partial (or 
qualified) project financing. Like in pure project financing, the lender's risk 
here remains to a great extent in the project, but the repayment of the loan no 
longer depends solely on the project's assets and cash flows.38 Partial project 
financing is equivalent to the concept of limited recourse financing. Here, the 
lenders have the benefit of some form of support from outside the project. In 
other words, the project lenders have direct or undirect recourse - predefined 
and limited in the financing documents - to the project's sponsor(s) and/or 
other third parties interested in the project in question.39 The outside credit 
support may take several forms of guarantees and support agreements, the legal 
nature and characteristics of which are discussed later.
The two categories of project financing mentioned above involve a project 
risk from the lender's point of view, i.e. the debt repayment is solely or largely
36 T H Donaldson and J P Morgan, The Traditional Approach, in Project Lending, 4 (T H 
Donaldson ed. 1992) 
37 McKechnie, 269; See also Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Mayers, Principles of 
Corporate Finance, 696 (5th ed. 1996). 
38 TH Donaldson and J P Morgan, 5. 
39 McKechnie, 269-270. 
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dependent on the success or failure of the specific project in generating 
sufficient cash flow. From the borrowers' point of view, a "conventional" 
corporate borrowing may also involve an element of project risk in situations, 
where a corporate borrower raises loans in its own name to fund a major 
project. Where the borrower's financial position is strong enough to bear the 
complete failure of the project without any significant weakening, this is not a 
project risk for the lenders, although it may be such for the borrower. The 
failure of the project can seriously weaken the borrower, although not, alone, 
destroy it. In this case, if there is any chance of project failure, the 
lenders' credit risk analysis and the conditions on which they lend may become 
more project orientated.40
In order to further describe the nature and the characteristics of project 
financing, comparisons can be made between project financing and limited 
recourse asset-based financing,41 as regards the value of the assets used by 
way of security. In limited recourse asset-based financing loans for the purpose 
of, for example, acquiring and redeveloping a property, may be agreed and 
structured so that the lender has no right to recourse from the borrower, except 
only to the extent of the proceeds of sale of the property in question and to the 
extent of the income derived from it. Such a loan would be secured by a 
mortgage over the property, and the rents to be paid under the leases would be 
assigned to lenders by way of security.42 Here, the value of the property used as 
security may, to a great extent, cover the amount of the loan. Similarly, 
typical for project financing is that there is mortgage over the project's physical 
assets and that the rights to the cash flow from the project are assigned for the 
benefit of the lenders. In project financing, however, the value of the physical 
assets comprising the project are typically substantially lower than the loan 
amounts advanced.43 Thus, the enforcement of security would offer a far from
40 TH Donaldson and JP Morgan 6. 
41 Asset-based financing or secured lending is the institution whereby a creditor can establish 
a right over the property of a debtor to secure the satisfaction of a debt or performance of an 
obligation. In case of default, the creditor can take redress against the specified property and 
is entitled to receive proceeds from its sale. See e.g. William Arthur Rich, A Survey of 
Asset-Based Lending in Central and Eastern Europe, 28 Butterworths Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law, Special Supplement, September 1995. 
42 Clifford Chance, Project Finance, 4 (1991). 
43 Id.
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fully satisfactory resort for project lenders. Therefore, in project financing, 
unlike in limited recourse asset-based financing, the project's economic 
viability is crucial and there is a need to decide how the risks associated with 
the project are to be allocated between the lenders and the other parties of the 
project financing arrangement.44
3.3. Limiting of lenders' recourse
From the sponsors' point of view, the ultimate goal in project financing is to 
arrange for a project debt financing which benefits the sponsor, and at the same 
time is completely non-recourse to the sponsor, in no way affecting its credit 
standing and balance sheet.45 However, as mentioned before, projects rarely are 
financed independently, on their own merits, without limited outside credit 
support from sponsors. Project financings typically fall into the category of 
limited recourse financing.
Project sponsors seek to limit their own risk by limiting, as far as possible, 
the project lender's recourse against them. There are basically two ways to 
limit a lender's recourse to a project. Firstly, the recourse against the project 
sponsors, if the project is owned directly by them, can be limited by contract, 
i.e. by provisions in the credit agreement governing the financing of a project 
which remains part of a larger corporation.46 Under this limited recourse loan 
contract, the project lenders agree to look only to the specified assets and the 
cash flow on which they have security as resort for debt repayment. In addition, 
the project lenders exclude their rights to sue or to liquidate the sponsor, to levy 
execution over non-project assets, or to prove in the sponsor's liquidation. 47 
Contractual limitation, however, may prove difficult to draft in the financing 
documents, technically unsatisfactory, and in practice uneffective in isolating 
the sponsor company's liability and risk.48
44 Id.
45 A.D.F. Price, Financing International Projects, 45 (ILO International Contraction 
Management Series No. 3 1995). 
46 McKechnie, 272. 
47 See Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 23. 
48 McKechnie, 272. 
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The other way of limiting recourse is to segrate the project into a special 
purpose vehicle company, and use it as a borrowing entity.49 If the project and its 
assets are transferred and segregated from the project sponsor's ownership into 
a legally separate borrowing entity, and if this borrowing entity is a company 
of which partners or shareholders are not personally responsible for the 
liabilities of the company (e.g. a limited liability company or a company 
limited by shares), the debt repayment is the borrowing company's, not the 
project sponsors' (shareholders') obligation.50 Any guarantees given by the 
project sponsors will, of course, override this limitation of the sponsors' 
liability. Normally, project sponsors are required to provide some sort of 
limited credit support to project lenders (limited recourse finance).
In many countries, the establishment of a local project company for 
operating a project is required by the foreign investment laws or host 
governments. For this reason, only a project financing structure involving a 
local project company as a borrower is examined in this study.
49 Id.
50 Clifford Chance, 20. 
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4. REASONS AND INCENTIVES FOR PROJECT FINANCING
4.1. Sponsors' economic reasons
The initiators in project financing arrangements are the sponsors of the 
project, who need debt financing for the implementation of a specific project. 
A sponsor might be one company, or a consortium of interested parties like 
contractors, suppliers, and/or purchasers of the project's production, of its 
goods or its services.51 The motivation of a project sponsor to implement the 
project may be to make a profit by selling the product produced by the project, 
or to provide processing or distribution of a basic product of the sponsor 
himself, or to ensure a source of supply, vital to the sponsor's own business.52
The sponsors investing equity capital for the project can be called owners of 
the project.
Project financing, for various reasons, is more expensive than 
conventional corporate financing. Firstly, the lenders, their technical experts 
and the lawyers have to spend a lot of time in evaluating the project and 
negotiating the complex project documentation. Secondly, monitoring of the 
technical progress and performance of a project and policing the loan during 
the life of the project, is costly. Thirdly, the charges made by the project 
lenders for assuming additional risks are high.53 The advantages of project 
financing to the project sponsors must, therefore, be substantial to 
compensate for these additional costs.
Nevertheless, from a sponsoring company's point of view, there are 
various economically beneficial reasons for project financing. Firstly, project 
financing is often the only option where debt financing is needed to finance a 
major investment project. In many cases, there is no alternative between 
project financing and conventional corporate debt, the sponsor company 
having insufficient non-project assets and cash flow on which its financing 
could be based.54 (In these situations, even though the entire sponsor 
company would be liable for debt repayment with all its assets and cash flow, 
the loan for
51 Id. 9.
52 Peter K Nevitt and Frank Fabozzi, Project Finance, 3 (6th edition, Euromoney 
Publications.1995). 
53 Clifford Chance, 5. 
54 McKechnie, 274. 
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financing a project is de facto project financing and should be assessed as such 
by the lenders). In cases where project sponsors, in principle, could choose 
between project financing and conventional corporate borrowing, the first and 
most powerful motive for borrowing on limited recourse terms is the desire to
limit their risk to the amount of equity invested and to share risks of the project 
with project lenders.55 For example, if a project sponsor initiates a project, the 
total investment cost of which is five hundred million dollars, it may be able 
and willing to invest one hundred million dollars as equity in such a project. 
The sponsor company, however, may not be willing to invest additional equity 
in the project or to borrow additional money in his own name in order to 
finance the project. This is because, if the project fails, such exposure could 
lead to the bankruptcy of the sponsor company. Thus, the sponsor will seek 
financing from banks willing to take on project risks. In other words, in project 
financing "a sponsor will risk a loss of his investment, or even risk a loss 
before the lenders to the project suffer a loss, but it will not risk its own 
corporate existence."56
The second inherent incentive for project financing is the leverage 
effect, i.e. a smaller percentage of equity in relation to the total investment may 
allow higher dividends and a quicker return on the equity investment for a 
project sponsor.57 Project companies' debt/equity ratio may be very high. Of 
course, the amount of debt financing varies from project to project. Typically, 
for a private project, the need for project lending is to cover approximately 
forty to fifty percent of the total project cost.58 In some projects the amount of 
debt capital is extremely high. For example, in energy projects it can be even 
ninety percent.59
The third important incentive of the project sponsors for seeking project
 financing is the concept of off-balance sheet financing.60 Here, the project 
sponsors aim to avoid the appearance of dept repayment obligations on their
55 McKechnie, 273; Harries, 347. 
56 Harries, 347. 
57 Id.
58Rauner, 157. 
59 Ira L. Freilicher, Energy Financing from the Developer's Perspective, 10. The International 
Conference on the Clean and Efficient Use of Coal. Budapest, Hungary 1992. 
60 Harries, 348. 
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balance sheets, which would adversely affect to their credit rating and, 
consequently, possibly increase the interest rate of their future borrowings.61
If the sponsor companies establish an independent project company, charged 
with the construction and operation of a project, and will use this company as 
a borrowing entity, the loans made for financing the project do not, in 
principle, depending on the national accounting law and practice applicable to 
the sponsor companies, appear significantly (if at all) on their balance sheets. 
While the project lenders frequently require some form of limited 
guarantees for securing the debt repayment of a project company, the sponsor 
companies may try to avoid the appearance of direct payment guarantees on 
their balance sheets by using alternative forms of debt repayment obligations. 
This, of course, can be done only in close collaboration with the project 
lenders. The necessary credit support can be given, for example, under a
take-or-pay contract, in which the sponsor company obliges itself to buy the 
project company's whole production or a certain portion of it. Here, the 
sponsor company is obliged to pay a fixed price periodically, whether the 
products actually are supplied or not.62 The proceeds under the take-or-pay 
contract can be assigned to the project lenders, thus assuring the debt service. 
Whether the project sponsor's obligation under the take-or-pay contract is 
required to be disclosed in the sponsor's balance sheet, depends on the 
national accounting law and practice of the sponsor's home country.63
Although the accounting treatment differs from country to country, it is likely 
that, by virtue of developing accounting practices, fewer disguised forms of 
credit support given by project sponsors can escape the balance sheet 
treatment. Where the accounting treatment, however, "follows the form rather 
than the substance", off-balance sheet considerations remain highly 
relevant.64 
6l SeeA.D.F.Price,45.
62 See Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 316 and 317. 
63 Harries, 348. 
64 Roger McCormick, Freshfields, Project Finance - Legal Aspects, in Project Lending, 180 
(TH Donaldson ed. 1992). See also Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 316. 
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4.2. Sponsors' legal reasons
In addition to the economic reasons and incentives discussed above, there may 
also be some legal factors that can affect a project sponsor's choice between 
project financing and conventional corporate borrowing in its own name. The 
sponsor company's constitutional or corporate documents, e.g. articles of 
association, statutes and by-laws etc., may contain provisions where the power 
of the sponsor company or its directors to raise money by borrowing and/or to 
give guarantees, may be limited to a determined amount. Restrictions on 
conventional borrowing may also be included in the sponsor company's 
existing loan agreements. Limitations may exist, especially in unsecured loans 
where, instead of taking security, the lenders may be willing to rely on 
financial covenants of a loan agreement, which require the borrower to keep to 
certain debt/equity ratios or other formulae.65 Depending on the actual wording of 
the restrictions, they sometimes might be avoided by using a wholly or 
partially owned special purpose project company as a borrowing entity.
As to the restrictions on giving guarantees in corporate documents or 
existing loan agreements, a sponsor company may be able, depending again on 
the wording of the restriction in question, to support the financing of a project 
by entering into e.g. a take-or-pay contract instead of giving a straightforward 
guarantee to project lenders. Under a take-or-pay contract, the sponsor 
company is obliged to pay, periodically, fixed prices for the project's 
end-product, in order to ensure a sufficient cash flow for the debt service of 
a project company. This kind of obligation may escape falling within the scope 
of guarantee restrictions.66 As already previously discussed, the use of a 
take-or-pay contract may also involve the benefit of an off-balance sheet 
treatment.
4.3. Lenders' incentives
From the commercial banks' point of view, the financing of projects may offer 
attractive financing opportunities. Willingness to assume higher risks inherent 
to project financing can be compensated by higher margins of profit. Compared 
to conventional corporate financing, the project financing approach may be 
beneficial by offering recourse limited to a particular project, but being secured
65 Id. Financial covenants are discussed more closely in Chapter 9 below.
66 Wood, Law and Practice of International Financing, 316.
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on the project's assets and the proceeds from the sale of its product. This 
benefits the lenders, who thereby are protected from the claims of sponsor 
company's creditors; i.e. the sponsor company's own creditors have no 
competing claims against the assets of a project company. 67
67 Norton Rose, Project Finance: The Way Forward In Eastern Europe, International Energy 
Law, Special Supplement, July 1992, 44. 
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5. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND PROJECT RISKS
5.1. Project phases
Generally, the implementation of a project contains three phases. Focusing 
on the time dimension and on the project risks, these phases can be seen as 
distinct risk periods from the project lenders' perspective. When analyzing 
the risks, the project planners distinguish between the construction phase and 
the operational phase of the project.68
1) In the preparation or planning phase,  the feasibility and the 
engineering studies of the project are undertaken and completed. Moreover, 
the project contracts between the parties interested in the project are 
negotiated. The costs of this phase are normally financed by the equity of the 
sponsors or by loans fully guaranteed by them.69 Thus, the planning phase 
does not usually involve major risks for project lenders.
2)In the construction or pre-completion phase, the project loan will be 
disbursed and the construction of the project will begin. The construction 
phase covers the project before it is complete and able to produce its end 
product. In this phase, the project is absorbing finances, but does not generate 
any income. The lenders will usually allow a grace period for repayment.70
The construction phase is the period of the highest risks for project lenders. 
Completion of a project will mark the end of the construction phase and the 
beginning of the operational phase.71
3)In the operational phase, the project begins to produce goods or 
services, and - provided that the cash flow projections prove correct – 
generates enough revenues to cover the operational costs, the debt service for 
the project lenders, and the dividends for the shareholders (sponsors) of the 
project company. During the operational period, the long-term project loans 
are gradually repaid. Short-term project loans, however, might still 
occasionally be needed as working capital.72
68 Rendell and Niehuss, 32. 
69 Harries, 348. 
70 Clifford Chance, 20; Harries, 348. 
71 Clifford Chance, 20. 
72 Harries, 348. 
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5.2. Main categories of project risks
Since project financing is primarily based on a project's revenue and assets to 
provide the source of debt repayment, the project lenders are concerned about 
developments that would interrupt a project's revenue stream or reduce the 
value of the project assets.73 Only if the project generates a cash flow sufficient to 
cover the operating costs and the debt service, the lender can expect to 
recoup the amounts lent and to gain adequate compensation for the credit risk it 
has assumed. Hence, the project lenders assume the same project risks as the 
equity investors (owners, shareholders) of the project, although this happens 
on a better risk level, because of their priority right to project assets as 
creditors. Another issue, however, is that the project lenders frequently do not 
accept all the project risks to be carried on their own, but require contractual 
obligations to carry certain risks of other parties to the project.74
Next, the principal categories of project risks are introduced. Here it 
should be mentioned that there may be many approaches in categorizing the 
project risks. The following categories are made in order to present a general 
description of the causes and effects of the project risks.
Completion risk. The most extreme form of pre-completion risk is the 
possibility that the construction of the project is never completed. As a result, 
the project never generates any revenue, and the project company is unable to 
repay its debts to the project lenders.75 Less extreme forms of pre-completion 
risks are delays which threaten the viability of the project, or cost overruns 
which can be caused partly by delays.76 The materialization of these risks 
increase the need for finance to complete the project, making it less likely that 
the future revenues of the project company can service the debt in full.77
Operational risk. The precise form of operational risk depends on the 
nature of the project. As to operational risk, the question is, in short, whether 
or not the project can successfully produce its end-product (goods or services). 
The operational phase risks may include e.g. inadequacy of power, water or
73 Rendell and Niehuss, 32.  
74 See e.g.Teolis, 197. 
75TH Donaldson, 6. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.
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raw material supply, continued unavailability of qualified managerial 
personnel, or technical difficulties.78 As a result, the project probably may 
never produce as much, or as high a quality, as expected, or it costs more to 
run.79
Market risk. Like operational risk, the market risk may be materialized 
after the project is completed and its operation commenced. The market risk 
covers both supplies to the project and sales by the project. The supply risk is 
crucial where a project is dependent on its ability to purchase raw materials 
and/or energy at a certain price, in order to produce its product at sufficiently 
low costs. The other critical question is whether the project company can sell 
its production at a competitive price, covering both operational costs and debt 
service. The price fluctuations of both supply and sales markets can adversely 
affect the debt repayment ability of the project company.80
Political and regulatory risk. The major political risks endangering the 
project are expropriation of the project by the project's host country, 
governmental interference with the project's operations (ranging from 
excessive or unreasonable changes in laws relating to taxation, import duties, 
labor, local supply, nationalization of the project company's management, or 
environmental protection), war or civil disturbance threatening the construction 
or operation of the project, and blockage of foreign currency remittance (i.e. the 
risk that the funds earned by the project cannot be converted into currency 
required for the debt service and transferred outside the project's host 
country).81 As the focus in this thesis is on the legal relationships between the 
private parties of a project, the examining of risk management of political risks is 
excluded from the scope of this study.
The categories mentioned above are not meant to be an exhaustive list of 
project risks. The discussion of the risks is intended to serve as a basis for 
examining those contractual arrangements by which completion risk, 
operational risk and market risk affecting the project lenders' overall credit risk 
can be managed.
78 TH Donaldson, 7; Rendell and Niehuss, 32. 
79 Id.
80 Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 6; Harries, 349. 
81 Rendell and Niehuss, 32; Harries, 349. 
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Managing of project risks involves, as any risk management process, three 
main elements. These elements are:
1) identification of risks, 
2) evaluation of risks, i.e. estimation of the likelihood of an identified risk 
being materialized, and the estimation of its effects, and 
3) choosing of the most efficient and cost-effective risk minimization 
method.82
As to choosing the risk minimization method, there are three general ways to 
minimize the combinations of risks to be borne by each of the private parties 
involved in a project and its financing. Firstly, measures should be taken to 
reduce the overall risk confronting sponsors and lenders to the lowest possible 
level. Risk reduction seeks to minimize the probability of occurence of various 
contingencies which may adversely affect a project. In case of commercial 
risks, there is little the parties of a project can do to prevent the contingencies 
stemming from general business cycles or macroeconomic trends. The 
commercial risks arising solely from activities connected with a specific project 
can be controlled by project lenders, mainly through the exercise of careful 
business judgment and a variety of safeguard techniques, e.g. the hiring of 
independent experts to check the project design, careful selection of 
contractors, and checking out the credit standing of contractors.83
Secondly, the remaining risk should be allocated among the parties of the 
project in a mutually acceptable way.84 The allocation of risks is carried out in 
negotiations concerning project contracts (e.g. construction contract, equipment 
supply contract, raw material or energy supply contract, or the purchase 
contract of a project's product) and financing agreements. Negotiations on risk 
allocation are principally motivated by the following three factors: 1) the need 
to meet the standards for financeability of a project, 2) the objective that all 
significant risks should be allocated to the parties which are best able and most 
motivated to handle them, and 3) the need to be ensured that the residual risks
82 Pentti J. Laurila, Kansainvälistymisen riskit, 27 (1982). 
83 Rauner, 161-162. 
84  Id. 161 and 165 et seq.
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are reduced to a level that the sponsors and lenders can effectively manage.85 
Finally, each party may individually choose to reduce both its potential profit 
and the allocated risk by taking insurance. The use of insurance transfers risks 
and protects the party in question, but at the same time the insurance costs 
decrease the profit which the party expects to receive from a project.86
It should be noted that although the methods of risk reduction, risk 
allocation, and further risk spreading by insurance are analytically distinct, they 
are closely related and often overlapping in practice. For example, the ability 
of each party to insure is a major factor in determining the outcome of the 
risk-allocation process.87
5.3. Contractually manageable factors determining the project lenders' 
credit risk
After the discussion about the methods of risk reduction, risk allocation and 
insurance involving all the participants of a project, the focus in the following is 
on the risk minimization mainly from the lenders' point of view. When 
sponsors and project lenders employ the techniques of project financing in the 
typical form, they establish a separate legal entity (often a limited liability 
company or a company limited by shares) to construct and operate the project. 
The new project company is primarily financed through a combination of 
equity contributions from the sponsors and project loans from the banks.88
Sponsors and project lenders have different types of claims against the 
project company. As shareholders, the project sponsors can expect a return on 
their investment in the form of dividends, and they have a right to the project 
company's assets in liquidation only after the claims of the project company's 
creditors have been satisfied. As creditors, the project lenders expect return on 
their investment in the form of interest under the loan agreement. Unlike the 
shareholders' claims, their claims are fixed to the amount of the loan, and they 
have a priority right to the project company's assets in liquidation. For this
85 Fred Tinsley and David Eterovic, Project Finance: Australia, 3 International Financial 
Law Review, Special Supplement, August 1993. 
86 Rauner, 179. 
87 Id. 161. 
88 See e.g. Harries, 347; Rauner, 165-166. 
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reason, their investment generally involves less risk than the equity investment 
of the project sponsors.89
There are methods by which creditors generally can protect their returns. 
Firstly, the creditors can adjust their return to reflect the involved risk by
determining higher interest rates in loan agreements. As mentioned before, the 
higher risks lenders assume in project financing, compared to conventional 
corporate financing, are compensated by higher margins. The adjustment of the 
return to reflect the risk involved is frequently combined with the
diversification of credit risk, i.e. creditors spreading their claims among a large 
number of debtors.90 Since international projects often are so large that no 
single project lender is willing to bear the risk of financing it alone, the project 
financing arrangements often involve a number of lenders. Finally, a factor 
generally affecting the riskiness of all the claims is the creditors 'possibility to 
deduct in taxation the potential credit losses.91
In conventional corporate financing the lenders, in order to minimize their 
credit risk, concentrate on investigating the creditworthiness of a borrowing 
company. In project financing, however, the borrower is often a recently 
established company, charged with the construction and operation of a project, 
without operational history and assets on which the lending could be based on. 
Since the success of the project and the project company's debt repayment 
capability is dependent on the performances of a project's participants, the 
project lenders must carefully investigate the credit standing and operational 
history of the parties supporting and participating in the project, i.e. sponsors, 
contractors, equipment suppliers, energy and raw materials suppliers and 
purchasers of the project's end-product.
This study will now turn to a discussion on contractually manageable 
factors which determine the riskiness of a project lender's individual claim 
against a project company debtor. The first factor generally affecting the 
riskiness of a creditor's individual claim is the possibility of the creditor to 
have recourse to third parties, if the debtor cannot fulfil its debt repayment 
obligations.92 In project financing, the debt repayment securing obligations of
89 As to shareholders' and creditors' claims against a company, see Rapakko, 222. 
90 Rapakko, 224. 
91 If the marginal tax rate, for example, approaches 50 percent, the deductibility in effect 
halves the risk assumed by the creditor, assuming that the creditor will have a taxable income 
in that tax bracket at the time the loan loss is realized. See Rapakko, 227-228. 
92 See Rapakko, 227. 
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third parties may take several forms.
The second factor which the riskiness of a claim depends on is the priority 
right of the claim to a debtor's assets. The order of priority, in which the rights 
to corporate assets are satisfied, is determined by the underlying agreement 
concerning the claim and its security, by the security interest law, by the 
bankruptcy law and by the law on winding up of a corporation.93
Thirdly, the riskiness of a claim relates to a project lender's right to 
demand debt repayment under the project loan agreement. The act of a lender 
declaring the loans to be immediately due and payable is often called 
"acceleration". The riskiness of a claim is decreased if the creditor is entitled 
accelerate the loan at his own discretion, when the economic strength of a 
project company debtor, for one reason or another, is becoming weaker, and the 
debt repayment is thus endangered.
In addition, the riskiness of creditors' claims is determined by the debtor's 
operations and actions with third parties.94 Thus, the credit risk may be reduced if 
the lenders can use contractual methods for supervising and controlling the 
debtor and its assets.
Finally, the riskiness of a single creditor's claim is dependent on the 
competing creditors' rights and acts towards the debtor. Thus, a creditor's risk 
may be reduced if the creditors can agree, for their common interest, about the 
optimal actions in using their remedies against the debtor. In project financing, 
therefore, project lenders often enter into an inter-creditor agreement.
The factors identified above, affecting the riskiness of a creditor's 
individual claim, are to a large extent contractually manageable. They form a 
conceptual framework of risk minimization objectives within which the legal 
instruments, used for project lenders' protection, are categorized and examined 
in the following chapters.
93 Harries, 358; Rapakko, 226-227. It should be noted that the priority order of different types 
of claims may vary in national bankruptcy statutes. 
94 Rapakko, 228.  
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6. PROJECT LENDERS' RECOURSE TO THIRD PARTIES AND 
DEBT REPAYMENT SECURING THIRD PARTY UNDER-
TAKINGS
A factor generally affecting the riskiness of a creditor's individual claim is the 
possibility of the creditor to have recourse to third parties, if the debtor cannot 
fulfill its debt repayment obligations. In project financing, typically, an under-
capitalized project company is set up to own and to operate a project having 
insufficient capital and revenues to support the borrowings on the merits of its 
own credit standing. Therefore, project lenders must be provided with 
satisfactory credit support from creditworthy third parties, in respect of a 
debtor-creditor relationship between a project company and a project lender.
The essential objective of a project financing arrangement is to combine 
various kinds of guarantees and undertakings from various interested parties 
of a project. The purpose is that the financial burden or risk of any party will 
not be too heavy. As a result, the combined guarantees and undertakings of all 
the parties will constitute a satisfactory credit for project company borrowing.95
One of the reasons to project financing is that it not only makes 
risk-shifting possible between the sponsoring shareholders of a project 
company and the lenders, but that it also makes it possible to allocate risks to 
other third parties, who are not equity investors (shareholders) in the project 
company. These third parties, willing to oblige themselves to support a project, 
frequently receive benefits from the project in one form or another, and this of 
course is the motivation for their undertaking.96 Private parties supporting the 
finance of a project by guarantees or other types of undertakings can be 
divided into following categories:
1) Shareholders of a project company. Possibly also having some of the 
roles listed below.
2) Contractors. Contractors operate in the construction business and are 
thus interested in building a project.97
95 Nevitt and Fabozzi,255.
96 Id.
97 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 256. 
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3) Suppliers. Suppliers are interested in selling equipment, service, 
energy or raw material to a project.98
4) Buyers. Buyers are interested in buying the products and the services 
produced by a project.99
In project financing, the debt repayment securing obligations of third parties 
may take several forms. For the purposes of this thesis, a distinction is made 
between the direct and the indirect undertakings. Direct 
debt-repayment-securing undertakings constitute a payment obligation 
directly to project lenders. Indirect debt-repayment-securing undertakings, 
on the other hand, constitute a payment or other performance obligation to a 
project company for debt-servicing purposes. The promise to pay or perform 
may be given to the project company or to the project lender, or to both of them. 
The distinction of undertakings based on the aspect to whom the actual 
payment is directed, is seen here as reasonable. However, before the 
examination of guarantees and third party undertakings within the categories 
of direct and indirect debt-repayment-securing undertakings, two of them, 
comfort letters and completion guarantees, are discussed separately.
6.1. Comfort letter
A comfort letter is a document frequently found in project financing 
documentation. A comfort letter is usually given by the shareholder(s) of a 
project company or by some other interested party, in order to support the 
financing of the project company.100 Common letters may be used in 
circumstances where the shareholder of a project company or some other third 
party sponsor is unwilling to assume a legally-binding obligation to support the
98 See Nevitt and Fabozzi, 256; Rauner, 167. 
99 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 256. 
100 See Clifford Chance, 70; McCormick, 191. Letters equivalent to a comfort letter may also 
be called "letter of support", "letter of awareness", "letter of responsibility", "letter of intent" 
or "keep well letter". Documents in German may be entitled "Liquiditätsgarantie" or 
"Patronatserklärung", in Swedish "Stödbrev", and in Finnish "Tukikirje" or 
"Mukavuuskirje". See Simo Kärävä, Pankkiluottojen vakuuksien kehityspiirteitä, in 
Juhlajulkaisu Matti Ylöstalo 1917-4/2-1987 249-258 (1987) and Vesa Antero Annola, 
Sitooko Letter of Comfort-asiakirjassa ilmoitettu aikomus, in Vastuun samastuksesta ja 
muita kirjoituksia. Turun yliopiston oikeustieteellisen tiedekunnan julkaisuja (Ari 
Saarnilehto ed. 1996). 
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financing of the project company. The reasons for this are obvious. Firstly, a 
straightforward guarantee obligation might infringe on the guarantee 
restrictions in its corporate documents or loan agreements. Secondly, a 
straightforward guarantee may not be welcome on a balance sheet affecting 
credit standing and future borrowings of the obligor.101
The terms of the comfort letter, given by the shareholders of a project 
company to project lenders, might include:102
1) the statement of awereness of the financing of the project company, 
2) the commitment to maintain ownership interest in the project company, 
and 
3) the promise of support required by the project lenders. 
The statement of the awareness of financing has no legal effect. As to the 
maintenance of ownership interest, the shareholders may declare to maintain a 
specified percentage interest in the sharecapital of the borrowing project 
company, as long as the loan is outstanding.103 In other words, the intention is to 
assure the lenders that the shareholders are not going to abandon the project. As 
to the possible remedies, injunction might be available. Such a 
commitment, however, would hardly confer the right to damages, in case the 
ownership were lost and, subsequently, the project company was to become 
insolvent because of the shareholders not being liable for the debts of the 
project company.104 Normally, the ownership statement in a comfort letter only 
supports the expectation that shareholders will not allow their project company 
to collapse.105
As regards the forms of financial support required by lenders, a comfort 
letter may commonly only contain statements of intention, for example, "it is 
our intention that X- company will meet its financial obligations" or "it is our 
policy that the obligations of X-company will be met".106
101 Philip R Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance: Comparative Law of Security 
and Guarantees, 346 (1995). 
102 Id.
103 Wood, Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees, 347. 
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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The shareholders may also write statements assuring that the project 
company is properly managed and that they will exercise their voting rights to 
ensure that the project company will duly fulfill its debt repayment obligations. 
Moreover, the shareholders may state that they will not receive money from the 
project company, if this was to lead to a situation where the project company 
would not be able to meet its obligations towards the lenders.107 The legal 
effect of the terms of a comfort letter depends on the principles of contract law 
and the rules of construction. One of the general characteristics of comfort 
letters is that the language is too vague to constitute enforceable obligations. 
Damages may be a possible claim, based on the breach of statements, but it 
might be difficult to prove that the loss suffered by lenders was directly caused 
by the breach.108
Although a comfort letter seldom contains an effectively legally-binding 
obligation, it may in practice serve as effective support document as a 
straightforward guarantee.109 This is based on the fact that the infringement of 
statements made in a comfort letter document may damage the reputation and 
the subsequent borrowing opportunities of the writer of the letter.
6.2. Contractor's bonds and sponsor's completion guarantee - protection 
against completion risk
The completion risk is one of the principal concerns of lenders in an 
international project financing. Delays and cost overruns during the 
construction period may necessitate additional financing, and possibly re-
negotiation of debt repayment schedules. Contractor's bonds and sponsor's 
completion-guarantees are common devices for lender's protection against 
these risks.110
107 Wood, Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees, 347; Clifford Chance, 70. As to the 
statements included in comfort letters and their interpretation, see also Knut Rodhe, 
Moderbolags ansvar för dotterbolags skulder, in Festskrift till Jan Hellner 495 (1984) and 
Heikki Jartela, Vakuuskäsikirja, 274-276 (Heikki Jartela et al. eds. 1982). 
108 Wood, Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees, 347. 
109 Marti S. Kurkela, Pankkitakaukset kansainvälisessä kaupassa, 148 (1993). 
110 See Rendell and Niehuss, 39; Clifford Chance, 69 and 73. 
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6.2.1. Contractor's bonds
During the construction period of a project, the project sponsors and the lending 
banks are concerned to protect themselves against the contractors' and the 
suppliers' failure to perform as agreed in construction and equipment supply 
contracts. Therefore, the sponsors and the lenders require bonding from banks or 
surety companies. The bonds will usually constitute unconditional "on-demand" 
obligations in favor of the project company, either in the form of - a bond, a 
guarantee or a standby letter of credit.111 The types of undertakings the contractors 
may be required to arrange are, typically, performance bonds, advance payment 
bonds, retention money bonds, and maintenance bonds.112
6.2.1.1. Performance bond
Contractors of a project may get into financial difficulties and as a result 
become unable to complete the construction contract (completion risk). The 
situation of a contractor may be so bad that the construction company is forced into 
liquidation, and the project company or another contracting party is unable to recoup 
the financial losses. Such losses may be caused by subsequent delays in project 
completion, or increased costs when a new contractor is appointed. To cover these 
situations, a contractor may take out a financial guarantee in the form of a 
performance bond.113
111 Standby letters of credit are widely used by American banks in international transactions, as a 
surety by which an independent and primary obligation of the bank is established towards the 
beneficiary to make payment or accept a draft on presentation of certain documents. (Standby 
letters of credit have been created as a substitute for guarantees, which are ultra vires for banks in 
the U.S.) The undertaking normally serves as a surety in commercial transaction between the 
bank's customer (account party) and the beneficiary, in case of non-performance (or 
non-repayment) by a customer. Like letters of credit, the standby letters of credit create a primary 
obligation on the bank, independent of the underlying commercial transaction and its conditions 
and defences. See Norbert Horn, Securing International Commercial Transactions: Standby 
Letters of Credit, Bonds, Guarantees and similar sureties, in The Transnational Law of 
International Commercial Transactions, 282 (Norbert Horn and Clive M. Schmitthoff eds. 1982); 
Marti Kurkela, 132 et  seq                        
112 Clifford Chance, 73; A.D.F. Price, Financing International Projects, 49-51  (ILO 
International Construction Management Series No. 3 1995).
113 A.D.F. Price, 135. 
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Performance bond is an undertaking of a surety (bank or insurance 
company) towards a buyer or a customer, to provide for the proper performance 
of a construction contract in case the contractor fails to perform. If, for some 
reason, the contractor cannot complete the contract, the surety steps in and pays 
the client a sum of money equal to the loss incurred.114 In international 
transactions, a surety bond is often an unconditional obligation to pay on 
demand a sum of money, when the beneficiary considers that the contractor has 
failed to perform.115
6.2.1.2. Other forms of contractor's bonds
As to the legal nature, the other forms of contractor's bonds required by project 
sponsors and lenders may be similar to performance bonds, but they are used to 
cover different aspects of construction. Advance payment bonds are required if 
the construction contract provides for the project company to make an 
advance payment to the contractors, in order to assist them in buying the 
materials and the equipment needed to start the construction. In this case, the 
contractor might be required to provide a guarantee to refund the advance 
payment in the event of its failure to perform.116
The construction contract of a project may provide for the project 
company to retain a specified percentage of the progress payments to the 
construction company during the construction phase, in order to cover the 
rectification of defects which might not be immediately apparent. Retention 
bonds in an equivalent amount can be issued in lieu of payments to be 
retained.117
Maintenance bonds can be used to cover defects and to provide the funds 
to correct the defaults in construction discovered after the project has been 
completed. It is common for performance bonds and retention bonds to be
114 Norbert Horn, Bank Guarantees, Standby Letter of Credit, and Performance Bonds in 
International Trade, in The Law of International Trade Finance, 460-461 (Norbert Horn ed. 
1989); A.D.F Price, 135. 
115 A.D.F Price, 136. As to concept of performance bond in U.S. and English practise, see 
Norbert Horn, 460-461. 
116 A.D.F Price, 137; Clifford Chance, 73. 
117 Id.
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converted in maintenance bonds once construction has been completed.118
6.2.2. Sponsor's completion guarantee
Normally, project lenders will expect substantial credit support from project 
sponsors, until the completion of the project is achieved and it is shown to be 
capable of operating satisfactorily. This credit support is commonly given in 
the form of a completion guarantee with full or limited guarantee for 
outstanding loan amounts, thus relieving the lenders totally or partially of the 
completion risk.119
The contents of a completion guarantee may vary. It may mean a payment 
guarantee of the project sponsors to the lenders, covering the loan until the 
construction of the project is achieved and it is operating satisfactorily. Thus, a 
completion guarantee is essentially a guarantee limited in time.120 In practice, 
there are two ways the project lenders may require the sponsor to guarantee the 
project loans until the project is completed. Firstly, the lenders can seek to 
obtain a debt claim against the sponsor by requiring him to pay a fixed sum 
under a completion guarantee, if completion does not occur by a specified date. 
Secondly, the lenders may insist that the sponsor in question provides them 
with a letter of credit, or bond, from a bank, with such terms that they are able to 
call on a letter of credit or bond if completion does not occur when it should.121
In addition, a completion guarantee may also mean an undertaking by the 
sponsor to the lenders, where they agree:122
1) to ensure that the project will be completed in accordance with agreed 
technical specifications by a long-stop date, 
2) to provide overrun finance and to contribute additional equity, if 
required to complete the project, 
3) to ensure that the project company satisfies certain financial test cover 
118 Id.
119 See Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 217 (1980) and Harries, 355. 
120 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 260. 
121 Vinter, 109. 
122 Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 317 (1980); Harries, 355. 
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ratios, in order to establish the initial financial soundness of the project 
before the lenders assume the commercial risk during the operational 
phase of the project.
It should be noted here that if a project sponsor fails to meet those undertakings 
mentioned above, the remedies for project lenders may be weak. Depending on 
the jurisdiction in question, a court order for specific performance of such an 
undertaking may be difficult to obtain. The amount of damages for the 
non-performance of a contractual obligation, on the other hand, might be 
difficult to assess.123
6.3. Direct debt-repayment-securing undertakings
For the purposes of this study, the obligations constituting a payment 
obligation directly to project lenders are called direct debt-repayment-securing 
undertakings. Guarantee is the most familiar form of direct 
debt-repayment-undertakings in project financing. Guarantee can be 
described as the strict undertaking of a party to pay a certain sum of money to 
the other party under certain conditions, in order to cover a risk of that party. 
Typically, the risk covered is a non-performance of another contract, the 
underlying or principal obligation. Any internationally uniform concept or 
definition of the guarantee does not exist.124
In general, guarantees are used for the purpose of providing another source 
for debt repayment, if the original debtor cannot fulfill its contractual 
obligation. In project financing, this is not necessarily the only reason for 
lenders to take a guarantee. A borrowing project company is under the control 
of the sponsoring companies (shareholders) who are, in fact, the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the project loan, in economic terms. Here, the guarantee of the 
controlling sponsor companies may be taken, not only directly for credit 
reasons but also to ensure that the project company is operated in accordance 
with the lenders' interests.
123 Vinter, 109. 
124 Horn, 278-279. 
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6.3.1. Deficiency guarantee
Guarantees may not be required to cover the whole of the lender's credit 
exposure just in order to be effective tools in project financing. A lender may 
feel comfortable in lending to a project company, provided it is of the opinion 
that the project will have only limited deficits under the worst possible 
circumstances, and that it has an agreement by which such deficits will be 
made up by the guarantor.125
An ordinary deficiency guarantee (also called a first loss guarantee) is, 
inherently, limited in amount and designed to make up the deficiency 
suffered by a creditor in the event of default, of repossession of collateral, or 
of resale. Typically, it covers all of the lender's expenses, including the 
unpaid loan balance, any interest lost, and resale expenses.126 With a limited 
deficiency guarantee, a maximum limit is placed on the amount of the 
guarantor's exposure, using either an absolute (e.g. dollar amount) or a 
percentage figure.127 In project financing, a limited deficiency guarantee can 
be used in situations where a particular collateral for the loan has substantial 
market value.128
Example.
- the original cost of some particular project equipment is USD 100,000 
- the limited deficiency guarantee of a project sponsor is determined to 
be 25% of the original cost of the equipment 
- the amount of the loan outstanding is USD 75,000 
There is a charge on the equipment and it is repossessed and sold for 
USD 55,000, including expenses. Here, the guarantor would be liable for 
USD 20,000. If the equipment was resold for USD 45,000, the guarantor 
would be liable for USD 25,000 dollars (the maximum limit of the 
guarantee).
If the creditor and the guarantor agree, a limited deficiency guarantee may be 
reduced on the term of the loan in proportion to the loan amortization. If this 
method is used, the guarantor shares in the reduction of risk facing the lender. 
In addition, the reduced liability of a guarantor reflects positively on its 
balance sheet.129
125 See Nevitt and Fabozzi, 259. 
126 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 265; Rauner, 168-169. 
l27 Rauner, 169. 
128 Id.
129 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 265; Rauner, 169. 
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Example.
Limited guarantee of 20% on loan amount of ten million dollars means an 
initial liability limit of two million dollars for the guarantor. When the 
loan is amortized to nine million dollars, the guarantor is liable for a 
maximum of 1.8 million dollars.
It is characteristic for a deficiency guarantee that the extent of liability of a 
guarantor is dependent on the successful sale of a charged property. Only after 
the property is sold it is possible to know how much the guarantor has to pay 
for a guarantee. For this reason it is in the guarantor's interest to agree with the 
lenders (e.g. in a guarantee document) on the principles to be followed in the 
sale of the charged property.130
6.3.2. Contingent guarantee
In certain circumstances, project lenders willing to finance the project company and 
assume most of the project risks are concerned about the most remote and/or costly 
contingencies. The potential loss from those contingencies might be so great that the 
project lenders regard themselves as unable to bear the risk. In such a situation, the 
project company's shareholders or other third parties may be willing to provide a 
contingent guarantee under which the guarantor agrees to meet the project 
company's obligations, in case a specific contingency occurs131
The guaranteed contingency may be defined in various ways in the guarantee 
document. For example, the contingency may be deemed to occur in case of a 
number of events, such as the failure of other interested parties to the project 
financing arrangement in performing or paying, after reasonable efforts by the 
lender(s) to enforce performance or collection.132 Further, the contingent guarantee 
may take the form of some event beyond the control of the parties. Typically, the 
contingency may be an unlikely event, such as a change in market price, an action 
of government, or some uninsurable act of God.133 Given a small likelihood of the 
possibility of the guarantor performing under such guarantees, the impact of 
providing these should be minimal on the
130 See Matti Ylöstalo, Takauksesta, 156-157(1969). 
131 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 260; Rauner, 171. 
132 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 260. 
133 Id.
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project sponsors' balance sheets.134
6.3.3. Loan purchase agreement
The general principle is that the change of a creditor is valid even without the 
debtor's consent. Thus, the liability to pay the debt of a project company may be 
arranged by entering into a purchase agreement, whereby the project sponsors 
agree with the lenders to purchase the amount of their loans in the event of a 
project company's default.135 The main difference between a purchase agreement 
and a straightforward guarantee is that the breach of purchase agreement, 
depending on the applicable law, may result in damages — but not a liquidated 
demand for the whole debt.136 The obligation to buy the outstanding loans can 
hardly meet the off-balance sheet objectives under the well-developed national 
accounting standards.
6.3.4. Repurchase agreement
As mentioned above, a project company is financed through the combination of 
debt capital and equity. Project sponsors may make their equity investment to a 
project company either in cash or in kind contribution. The project company 
frequently grants the project lenders a maximum security on the project assets. 
Here, the project lenders are interested in the value which the contribution in kind 
item (e.g. in form of a plant, equipment, machinery or other capital goods) has as 
collateral for the loan. It also should be noted here that the project sponsors and 
the lenders are not necessarily unanimous as regards the market value of the 
contribution in kind. However, the project sponsors may assure the value of their 
contribution in kind by entering into a repurchase agreement with the project 
lenders.
In a repurchase agreement, the shareholder(s) of a project company, for 
example, may agree with the project lenders to purchase a particular asset of the 
project company at a predetermined fixed price, in case the project company has 
become insolvent and the project lenders as secured creditors cannot sell the asset 
in question elsewhere at a minimum price determined in
l34 Rauner, 171. 
135 Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 22. 
136 Wood, Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees, 355. 
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the repurchase agreement.137
6.3.5. Cross-default clause
The legal instruments discussed above involve a legally-binding obligation to 
perform for lenders under certain conditions. In certain situations, it is 
conceivable that a cross-default clause in the sponsoring company's own credit 
agreement might give enough credit support to satisfy the project lenders, not 
by obliging but in practice forcing the sponsoring company to assume liabity 
for the debt repayment of the project company.138
Cross-default can be defined as an event of default triggered by a default in the 
payment - or by an actual or potential acceleration of the repayment -of other 
indebtedness of the borrower or another person139 It is conceivable that a 
project sponsor and a project lender, in order to support the financing of a 
project company, would agree to cross-default clauses existing in the 
sponsoring company's own credit agreements, to be applied to the project 
company's project loan agreement (and possibly other contracts too). As a 
result, if the project company would be in default, the sponsoring company 
would be in default as well, as regards its own credit agreement. If the 
continuance of the sponsoring company's own credit agreement is of such an 
importance for it that it cannot be let accelerated, the lender could be confident 
that the project company debt will be paid, since the interested party would pay 
off the project company's debt rather than allow its own loans to be 
accelerated.140
137 Interview March 19, 1997. Jukka Ahmala, General Counsel. Finnish Fund for Industrial 
Cooperation Ltd. Also, put options concerning specified project assets can be used to 
establish a floor value for the project. A put option can be provided that entitles the lenders to 
put specified project assets to a third party, in the event of default under the financing 
agreements. Once such a put option is exercised, the third party is required to purchase the 
relevant assets. See Robert L. Drake, A Security Problem. Trade Finance, 30 (Euromoney 
Publications, January 1992). 
138 See Nevitt and Fabozzi, 266. 
139 Clifford Chance, 102. 
140 See Rauner, 176. 
325
6.4. Indirect debt-repayment-securing undertakings - support agreements
Support agreements often are an essential part of the project financing 
arrangement. They constitute a payment or other performance obligation in 
favor of the project company. Economically, these agreements, nevertheless, 
have a function of quasi-guarantee, since they assure the cash flow or the funds 
to the project company, which is required to continue operations and pay the 
debt service, even if the project is not performing.141 Typically, the project 
company assigns its rights under the support agreements to the project 
lenders.142 The combination of unconditional payment obligation in a support 
agreement, and the assignment of rights under it, may in practice give lenders 
nearly as much comfort as a straightforward direct guarantee.
6.4.1. Investment agreements
Under an investment agreement the project sponsors or shareholders agree to 
provide financial support to the project company. Typically, investment 
agreements take the form of a working capital maintenance agreement or a cash 
deficiency agreement. Under a working capital maintenance agreement, the 
project sponsors agree that they will finance the project company, by way of 
subordinated loans or equity capital, in sufficient amounts to ensure the 
solvency of the project company or to meet certain prescribed financial tests, 
such as a specified minimum working capital ratio.143 Under a cash deficiency 
agreement, the sponsors may agree that they will pay to the project company 
sums equal to the amounts which are required to service and repay the loan.144
These agreements, in many cases, may be made between the sponsors and the 
project company. The rights of the project company under the agreement are 
then immediately assigned to the project lenders.145 Here,  the  lenders  as  
assignees cannot get a better right than the project company originally had as an 
assignor under the agreement.
141Harries, 355. 
142 Id. 356. 
143 Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 318; See also Clifford Chance, 70. 
144 Id.
145Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance 318. 
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A claim for breach of an investment agreement might prove to be difficult 
in practice. The remedy for breach is damages, and usually there is no right to 
compel the "guarantor" to invest.146 The lenders would have to prove actual 
financial loss and they would also have an obligation to mitigate that loss. In 
order to prove the loss, it might also be necessary to first enforce security and 
use all the other possible remedies that the lenders might have against the 
borrowing project company and the project sponsors.147 Moreover, the 
obligation to invest may not be performable if the debtor (the project company) 
is in liquidation, because the debtor is no longer entitled to borrow or issue 
shares.148
6.4.2. Take-or-pay contract
Since in project financing the debt repayment of a borrowing project company 
is largely dependent on sufficient cash flow during the term of the loan, the 
critical question for project lenders is whether the project company can sell its 
production (goods or services) at a price which covers operational costs and 
debt service. Price fluctuations in the sales markets of a project's end product 
may thus adversely affect the debt repayment ability of the project company. 
Ensuring sufficient cash flow and protection against lower prices or lack of 
demand of a project's end product may be achieved through various forms of 
forward sales agreements, i.e. through the conclusion of long-term, 
price-specific sales contracts with the customers, before the production 
begins.149 It should be noted that pre-selling to customers frequently carries a 
cost for the project company, since the pre-buyers will expect a favorable 
price in return for their commitment.150 This cost can be regarded as an 
insurance premium -the project company ensures for itself a pre-determined 
revenue stream in return for reduced prices. In addition, the project company 
(the seller) loses the opportunity to take advantage of possible later price 
increases. Normal long-term sale contracts do not assure that the project will 
be able to meet its debt
146 Wood, Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees, 355. 
147 Clifford Chance, 70. 
148 Wood, Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees, 355. 
149 T H Donaldson and J P Morgan, 14-15; Rauner, 171-172. 
150 T H Donaldson and J P Morgan, 15. 
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service obligations, even if they appear to ensure a cash flow that would be 
sufficient for debt service purposes. This is because the sales contracts 
normally obligate buyers to make payment only upon delivery of the goods or 
services purchased, or upon delivery of documents representing the goods. In 
order to deal with this problem, the project lenders often insist that the project 
company obtains take-or-pay contracts from the sponsors of the project.151
The take-or-pay contract has two main parallel objectives: to protect the 
project and the project lenders against the sales market risk, and to serve as an 
indirect debt repayment obligation. Under a typical form, the project sponsor 
enters into a purchase agreement with the project company under which the 
sponsor agrees to buy all the project production, goods or services, or a certain 
portion of them. The project company then pledges or assigns its rights under 
the take-or-pay contract to the project lenders.
The project lenders, to a certain extent, may rely upon the take-or-pay 
contracts for repayment of their loans. The basic idea of a take-or-pay contract is 
to approximate the trading contract to a loan obligation. The take-or-pay 
contract can be defined as a long-term agreement between a purchaser (a 
project sponsor) and a seller (a project company), involving an unconditional 
contractual obligation to make periodic payments in the future for fixed or 
minimum amounts or quantities of products, goods or services, at fixed 
minimum prices.152 If the project lenders rely solely upon a take-or-pay contract 
for repayment of their loans, the payments must be in an amount sufficient to 
cover the operating costs of the project and the loan payments.153
Characteristic for the take-or-pay contract is that the payment obligation 
of a purchaser is, as far as possible, unconditional, i.e. the payment must be 
made whether or not the services are actually rendered or the goods actually 
delivered.154 The obligation is either not cancellable or it is cancellable only 
with the consent of the other party, or in the event of some remote 
contingency.155
151 SeeRauner, 172. 
152 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 276. As to definiton, see also Clifford Chance, 70 and 109. 
153 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 276. 
154 Id.; Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 317. 
155 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 276. 
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The take-or-pay contract can take different forms, depending on the nature 
of the project in question. Generally, the take-or-pay contract may be a contract 
for:
- the purchase of goods produced by a project, such as minerals, 
hydrocarbons or manufactured goods, or
- the purchase of services, such as the processing of a product or the use 
of a pipeline (known as throughput contracts) or use of a transportation 
system (known as tolling agreements).
Each type of take-or-pay contract will be subject to different legal rules, e.g. a
sale of goods contract will be subject to sale of goods legislation, unlike it is 
in case of tolling agreements, but the underlying principles discussed above 
remain the same.156
In its most extreme form, the nature of an obligation to pay is absolute 
and, under the so-called hell-or-high-water clauses, not limited by any events, 
in particular not by force majeure.157 The absolute nature of payment obligation 
of the take-or-pay contract may, however, give rise to several legal problems 
and considerations. If the project company providing goods or services to the 
buyer under a take-or-pay contract fails to comply with the terms of the 
contract, the buyer might be able to reduce the purchase price or cancel the 
contract. As a result, the credit support, provided by a take-or-pay contract for 
the project lenders, would be reduced or cancelled as well.158 Therefore, firstly, 
the project company's obligations as a seller (e.g. liability for delays in 
delivery or defective goods), under the take-or-pay contract, should be agreed 
to minimum. Otherwise, there would be a major risk of breach of contract 
enabling the buyer to counterclaim or cancel the contract. For this reason, the 
buyer should agree to pay e.g. "for the expectation of the goods or services".159
Secondly, special attention should be paid on the applicable law, which may 
imply certain obligations to the project company as a seller. These implied 
obligations affecting the project company should be excluded, if possible.160
156 See Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 318. 
157 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 276; Harries, 356. 
158 See Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 320. 
159 Id.
160Id.
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Thirdly, especially if common law principles are applicable to the take-or-pay 
contract, the project company should be protected against the effect of the 
doctrine of frustration of the contracts. Under the doctrine of frustration, the 
obligations of the parties automatically terminate in situations where events 
render impossible the further performance of the contract and the contract 
omits to make provision for these possible events.161 If a take-or-pay contract is 
frustrated and therefore terminates by operation of law, the credit support for the 
financing of the project company terminates as well. Therefore, the take-or-pay 
contract should specifically identify events deemed not to be within the 
doctrine of frustration.162
The extreme form of a take-or-pay contract described above protects 
against the market risk as well as the operating risk of a project. In broad terms, 
the take-or-pay contract, combined with the assignment of the sellers' rights 
under it by way of security to the project lenders, serves nearly the same 
function as a corporate guarantee. Under the strict payment obligation, 
determined in the take-or-pay contract, the buyer in effect takes responsibility 
for the payment of the project loan.
6.4.3. Exclusive supply agreement
In case the goods produced by the project company are inevitable for the 
project sponsors, but they are considering themselves unable to oblige to buy 
the project company's production at predetermined fixed prices, it might be 
possible for the project lenders to accept an exclusive supply agreement as a 
substitute for a take-or-pay contract. Under an exclusive supply agreement 
between the project company and the sponsoring company, it is agreed that the 
latter will not purchase similar goods from any other source for a 
predetermined time period.163 If the sponsoring company is a creditworthy 
enterprise with good business prospects, such an agreement, although not 
expressly obliging it to make payments to the project company, would give the 
lenders good grounds for believing in a sufficient cash flow being received by 
the project company for the debt servicing purposes. An exclusive supply
161 As to doctrine of frustration, see e.g. Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract, 332 (2nd ed. 
1993).
162 Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 321. 
163 See Rauner, 175. 
330
agreement may effectively protect the project lenders against the sales market 
risk of the project's production, and could be used to support financing of the 
project company in case guarantees are not available and/or other debt 
repayment ensuring obligations have to be supplemented. 164 However, when 
project financing arrangements involve exclusive supply agreements, the 
parties should be sensitive in taking into consideration the relevant provisions 
of competition law.
6.4.4. Supply-or-pay contracts
Previously, the focus has been on the buyers and on those obligations which are 
protecting the project lenders against the sales market risk (and at the same 
time ensuring income for the project company). As regards the put-or-pay or 
the supply-or-pay contracts, the focus is on the supply markets and the 
suppliers of the project.
Supply-or-pay or put-or-pay contracts are long-term contracts made 
between a project company and the suppliers of energy, raw material or 
manufactured goods. Under these contracts, the supplier (typically a project's 
sponsor) is obliged either to supply energy, raw material or products at a fixed 
price, or to pay to the project company the difference in costs incurred in 
obtaining the supplies from another source.165 Similarly to a buyer's obligation 
under a take-or-pay contract, the suppliers' obligation to perform under the 
supply-or-pay contract should be agreed, as far as possible, unconditional. The 
essence of supply-or-pay contracts is that they fix the operating costs of a 
project to a certain predictable level, thus, in part, ensuring that the income 
cash flow of the project company is sufficient to service the debt for project 
lenders.166
164 Id.
165 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 277; Clifford Chance, 72. 
166 Id.
331
7. PROJECT LENDERS' PRIORITY RIGHT TO PROJECT ASSETS
7.1. Ranking of investors and types of capital in respect to a project 
company's assets
Project financing involves different types of investors, and different types of 
financing, i.e. equity contributions or subordinated loans of the project 
sponsors, unsecured loans, and secured loans. Each type of financing confers a 
different ranking on the investors' claims against the project company's assets. 
The order of priority in which the investors' claims to corporate assets are 
satisfied, is basicly determined by agreement concerning the claim, the security 
interest law, the bankruptcy law and the law on winding up of a corporation. As 
already discussed above, one of the main factors which the riskiness of a claim 
depends on is the priority assigned to the type of claims in bankruptcy 
statutes.167
There are three main types of capital available to finance a project 
company: equity, quasi-equity and senior debt. Equity investment, in the form 
of share capital, represents the risk capital in project financing. Quasi-equity
may be invested by the project sponsors in the form of subordinated loans.168
Subordinatied loans are senior to equity capital, but junior to senior debt and 
secured debt. Equity and quasi-equity provide, for lenders, the basis to advance 
more senior forms of capital to the project company.169 From the lenders'point 
of view, equity and quasi-equity protect against project risks, especially against
167 Rapakko , 226
168 Subordination is a transaction whereby one creditor (junior creditor) agrees not to be paid by a 
borrower or other debtor until another creditor (the senior creditor) of the common debtor has been paid. 
Two forms of subordination may be distinquished. Inchoate subordination means that payments can be 
made on the junior debt until the borrower's liquidation or until the commencement of other insolvency 
proceedings. Like security, inchoate subordination is relevant only if the debtor is insolvent, because 
until then both junior and senior creditors can be paid in full. In complete subordination, no payments 
may be made on the junior debt until the senior debt has been paid. This form is commonly used to 
subordinate the debt of "insiders", such as parent companies or other shareholders, as a condition of 
bank loans, especially in the context of project financing. See Wood, Law and Practice of International 
Finance, 403; Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 37. 
169 Price, 45. 
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the pre-completion risk. Equity also protects against operational and market 
risks that might cause cost-overruns leaving too little cash flow to be used to 
service the debt.170
Senior debt can take the form of either unsecured or secured loans. Most 
borrowings from commercial lenders for project financing will be in the form 
of senior debt. Senior debt has priority of payment on the borrower's 
liquidation. Commercial loans are the most important source of senior debt for 
project financing.171
All investors may suffer losses if project risks materialize, but the equity 
investor (shareholder of a project company) is the first to suffer a loss, and 
most seriously affected. The equity investor has the highest risk, but also the 
highest profit if the project is successful. The most senior ranking creditors, i.e. 
the secured lenders, are best protected in a project crisis, but they still may 
suffer losses after the lower ranking equity investors and creditors have lost 
their investment.172
7.2. Unsecured project loans and contractual protection of project 
assets against other creditors
It is common in project financing for the lenders to take security over the 
project assets as far as this is possible under the laws of the country where the 
assets are located. However, there might be reasons why it is inappropriate or 
impossible to obtain such security.173 Unsecured project loans, which are not 
secured by a security interest in any project company's assets, may be available 
for the financing of a project, provided that the sponsors of the project have 
established a good reputation with the financial community and provided that 
sufficient share capital or subordinated loans have been invested to meet the 
equity risk capital requirements of the project.174 However, the unsecured 
project lenders' objective is to ensure, as far as possible, that if the borrowing 
project company should become insolvent, the greater part of its assets would
170 Donaldson, 13. 
171 Price, 46. 
172 See Harries, 358. 
173 See Clifford Chance, 63. 
174 A.D.F Price, 46. 
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be available for distribution amongst its original unsecured lenders, and would 
not be dedicated to cover the loans of other unsecured or secured creditors.175
This objective can be achieved by including various types of covenants in a 
project loan agreement, e.g. restrictions on borrowing and pledging of assets. 
In order to protect themselves, the unsecured project lenders may demand the 
borrowing project company to promise that it shall not make any other 
borrowings exceeding agreed borrowing limits or without a consent from the 
project lenders.
Another protection available for unsecured project lenders is to demand 
that the borrower commits itself to a negative pledge clause in a loan 
agreement. A negative pledge is an agreement by the debtor not to encumber 
its assets in favor of the third party (or not to encumber them by way of a 
security which would rank ahead of, or pari passu with the security given to 
the lender).176 Since a negative pledge does not confer rights on any asset of the 
debtor, but merely restricts his ability to give security to others, it does not 
constitute a security interest.177
The negative pledge is often coupled with a pari passu undertaking, in 
which the borrower agrees, as far as possible, not to allow any other creditor to 
obtain priority over the credit given by the lender to whom the undertaking is 
given.178 The purpose of the pari passu undertaking is to establish an equal 
treatment for the unsecured creditors.179
A negative pledge is a contractual commitment that, unlike a security 
interest, does not confer rights to possession, or control or sale of the 
borrower's assets. Being contractual obligation and binding only interpartes
in a debtor-creditor relationship, it does not confer any priority on the claims 
of the lender in the event of bankruptcy or liquidation.180
l75 SeeMcCormick,181. 
I76 R.M. Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security, 5 and 17 et seq. (2nd ed.1988). In the 
simplest form, the negative pledge might state:"So long as any of the loans are outstanding 
the borrower will not create or permit to subsist any mortgage, charge, pledge, lien or other 
encumbrance on its assets or revenues." See Wood, Law and Practice of International 
Finance, 147. 
177Id.
178McCormick, 181. 
l79 Urpo Levo, Ulkomainen luotonotto,73 (1985). 180
See Clifford Chance, 63. 
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Breach of a negative pledge frequently constitutes an event of default 
under the project loan agreement. Thus, the lender may react to the breach by 
accelerating the loan and calling for immediate payment. This, however, 
would be practical only if the project company borrower had sufficient funds 
for debt repayment. This is not usually the case if the debt is expected to be 
repaid mainly from the future cash flows generated by the project. 
For having breached its contractual obligation under the negative pledge 
clause, the project company borrower might be liable for paying damages. 
However, this probably would be little comfort to the lender if the project 
assets, on which the security interests is created in favor of another creditor, 
were relied on as a major source of repayment. 
If the borrowing project company creates a security interest in favor of a 
third party, in contravention of the negative pledge, it is likely that in most 
jurisdictions the security would be regarded as valid.181 In cases where the third 
party knew, or should have known, of the existence of the negative pledge, the 
lender might be able to challenge the validity of any security created in breach of 
it. In any case, the ability to challenge would very much depend on the 
circumstances of the case and on the rules of the relevant legal system.182 In 
some jurisdictions, there are examples of situations where an obligation given 
by one party may confer, to a certain extent, protection in favor of an obligee 
against a mala fide third party. It is possible that, in some jurisdictions, there 
are grounds for the courts to consider that, although the creation of a security 
interest in a breach of negative pledge is valid, the mala fide security holder is 
liable for paying damages to the party to whom the negative pledge 
undertaking was given.183 
7.3. Secured project loans 
Secured commercial loans are available to most projects where the assets 
securing the debt have value as collateral. Such assets should be marketable 
and readily convertible into cash. Project financing involves a variety of 
security arrangements. The collateral of real property, the payments due under 
181 Id.                                                                                      
182 Id.                                                                                           
183 Bertil G. Bylund, Något om s.k. negativa klausuler i låneavtal, in Festskrift till Knut 
Rodhe, 122-123(1976). 
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long-term sales contracts, and the assignment of contractual rights are all used 
as collateral in project financing. The availability of effective security on 
project assets can have a significant effect on the structure of the project 
financing arrangement, and on the overall allocation of risks and recourse 
between the parties involved.184 In the following pages, the focus is on the role 
and purpose of a security as the means of protection for project lenders.
7.4. The legal nature and effectiviness of a security interest
In project financing, by definition, the lender principally looks to the cash 
flows and earnings of the project as the source of funds for repayment, and to 
the assets of the project as collateral for the loan.185 Ideally, the security 
arrangement in project financing should cover all the project company's assets. 
This, however, is not always possible in all jurisdictions.186
Generally, a security interest can be defined as a right given to one party in 
the assets of another party to secure payment or performance by that other 
party or by a third party187 A lender taking security for an advance is 
concerned to see that if the debtor's assets are insufficient to meet the claims of 
all his creditors, the lender will at least be able to look to his security to obtain 
total or partial payment.188 To be effective, the security interest will have to confer 
to the lender's claim priority over the claims of the other parties asserting 
rights over the same asset, especially priority over the attaching creditors' and 
the bankruptcy creditor's claims. Moreover, to be effective, a security interest 
should confer to the security holder a better right to the assets, in respect of 
competing purchasers and mortgagees of the assets in question.189
184 Clifford Chance, 64. 
185 As to definitions of project financing, see page 1 and 15 above. 
186 Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 31. 
187 Goode, 1. 
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189See e.g. Wood, Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees, 167-168. 
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7.5. Aspects on creation of security in a project's host country
It is common in project financing for the lenders to take maximum security 
over the project assets, as far as this is possible under the laws of the country 
where the assets are located.190 Security interests on the project company's real 
property, such as land, buildings, equipment and goods, have to be established 
under the local security law. The law of the country where the object is situated 
(lex rei sitae) determines the effectiviness of the security interest, i.e. a security 
holder's right in respect of third parties, like attaching creditors, bankruptcy 
creditors, competing purchasers of the object and subsequent mortgagees. 
Local law also provides the legal framework for enforcing the security 
interest.191
Projects are often carried out in countries whose laws and legal systems 
are unfamiliar to the lenders. The project lenders, therefore, at an early stage, 
should carry out at least a preliminary analysis of the fundamental questions 
concerning the legal framework, for creation of security in the project's host 
country. The preliminary investigation should include at least the following 
issues:192
1) Which project assets can a security be created on? 
2) Are there any restrictions on the foreigners taking security, especially 
on land, and what kind of permits should be received from the relevant 
authority? 
3) Can security be created on user rights as well as on ownership rights? 
4) What formalities need to be complied with to perfect the security 
interest, e.g. notarizations, registrations and stamp duties? 
5) Can security on movable assets be created without physical transfer of 
those assets to the mortgagee or the pledgee? In other words, is a 
floating charge possible? 
6) Does the established security interest attach after-acquired property, 
like buildings and fixtures attached to mortgaged land? 
7) What is the order of priority on the liquidation of a project company 
and which creditors will, by law, be preferred over a secured creditor? 
8) Can a junior mortgagee prejudice the position of a senior mortgagee? 
There are two possible disadvantages of allowing junior mortgages on 
the same asset. Firstly, the junior mortgagee may have an independent 
right to enforce the security. Secondly, the presence of a junior 
190 Clifford Chance, 63. 
191 See Kaarina Buure-Hägglund, Irtaimiin esineisiin kohdistuvat reaalivakuudet, 89 (1978); 
Mettala, 222. 
192 See Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 327-331; McCormick, 186-187; 
Clifford Chance, 65. 
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mortgagee may prevent the senior mortgagee from advancing additional 
debt naving senior priority.
9) Can security be held by an agent or trustee for a group of creditors 
whose members might change from time to time (e.g. through transfer 
of their participation in the loan facility to another bank)?
10) Must there be a court order to enforce the security? 
11) Is the private sale of a security object possible, on enforcement, or 
must there be a court sale or a public auction? 
12) Can the secured lenders, as an alternative to sale, take possession of 
the security object on a default and collect the income from the 
security? 
13) Should the mortgage debt be expressed in local currency, even though 
the loan itself is denominated in a foreign currency? Here, the risk for 
the lender is that if the value of the local currency were to decline in 
respect to the currency of the loan, the lender might find himself 
unsecured for the difference. 
14) Does the local exchange control regulation permit the repatriation of 
the proceeds of a sale of security? 
7.6. The purposes of security in project financing
The realization purpose of security. Usually the purpose of security is to enable 
the lender, in an event of default under the loan agreement, to sell the asset on 
which the security is taken and to use the proceeds to pay out the outstanding 
loan amounts ahead of other creditors.193 In project financing, this purpose is 
important if the project assets include specific tangible assets which can be 
separated from the project and sold elswhere on the open market. However, it 
is often unlikely that the realisable value of the project assets would 
significantly cover the debts owed to the project lenders. For example, assets 
like land, equipment and machinery are often valuable only for the operation 
of the project. Therefore, the value of the project assets may well be minimal 
for the third parties, unless they are willing to take over the running of the 
project.194
The defensive purpose of security. Although the ultimate purpose of taking 
security is always to secure the debt repayment, the ability to sell the project 
assets may be an important, but not necessarily the primary reason for taking 
security on project assets. In project financing, the main purpose of taking
193 See Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 326; Vinter, 80. 
194 See Clifford Chance, 66 and 68; Vinter, 80. 
338
security on project assets is often defensive. 195Most project lenders do not 
consider that the prime purpose of the security is to give them the right to sell 
the debtor's assets, as they would in a more conventional secured financing. 
The common view is that in most cases the purpose of taking security is to 
prevent any third party from acquiring property rights in priority to the lenders; if 
a lender has security on an asset, he ranks ahead of the unsecured creditors, and 
the ability of the unsecured creditors to interfere adversely in the 
relationship between the debtor and the secured creditor is thereby limited.196 In
project financing, the logic behind the defensive purpose of security is that 
unsecured creditors would have little to gain by pursuing a disruptive action 
against the project company, e.g. attaching a crucial project asset. And even if 
the unsecured creditors took such an action, it is expected that the project 
lenders would, to a large extent, be insulated from its effects.197
The taking-over purpose of the security. Depending on the security and 
enforcement laws of the relevant jurisdiction, security arrangements may 
enable the lenders to take over and use an asset as opposed to merely selling 
it.198 In project finance, the ability of the lender to exercise operational control 
over the project assets can be more important than the ability to realize the 
assets by sale. As mentioned above, the project assets often are not marketable 
in practice, because of the nature of the assets. In such a case, the security over 
project assets may be taken in order to enable the lenders to take over the 
project and to operate it for his own benefit, and possibly, to sell the project as
a going concern. 199
The political risk insulation purpose of the security. The materialization 
of political risks (discussed in chapter 5.2 above) may adversely affect the 
project company's debt repayment ability. For this reason, it is important that 
security is taken on the project company's assets outside the jurisdiction of the 
project's host country. Typically, this involves taking security on export 
proceeds and using escrow accounts to receive those proceeds.200
195 See Vinter, 80; Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 30; Clifford 
Chance, 66; McCormick, 188. 
196 McCormick, 188; Vinter, 80. 
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Ideally, the security should cover all the project assets. Altogether, the 
security arrangement concerning project assets typically includes the following 
security interests:201
- mortgages on the land and the facilities 
- charges on inventory and equipment and other moveable goods 
- assignment of sales proceeds under the long term sales contracts 
- charges on bank accounts into which the proceeds of the sale of products 
are paid 
- assignment of rights under the project company's long term sales 
contract, long term supply contracts and other possible project contracts
Charge are also made on the shares of the project company representing 
ownership of the project assets. Each of these security interests may serve 
different purposes, from the project lenders' point of view.
7.6.1. Mortgages on land and facilities
The market value of the land, the buildings and the facilities might be minimal, 
since those assets may have only little value except for those parties who are 
willing to run the project in question. Frequently, the project lenders will ask 
for mortgage, if available, for defensive purposes in order to preclude the 
borrowing project company from granting a security interest in its key assets 
to other creditors.202
7.6.2. Charges on inventory and equipment and other moveable goods
 In many projects there will be some marketable tangible assets which can be 
separated from the project and sold on the open market. Security on these 
assets may be taken for both realization and defensive purposes. Since 
inventory, equipment and other moveable assets are needed in the day-to-day 
operation of the project, it should be possible to take security on these 
moveable assets, without physical transfer of those assets to the mortgagee or 
pledgee. This may be difficult in those jurisdictions which do not recognize a
201As to elements of security arrangements in project financing, see McCormick, 189; 
Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 31; Clifford Chance, 68. 
202 Rendell and Niehuss, 44. 
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floating charge. A floating charge is available in most common law countries, 
and at least five non-common law countries have created a general floating 
charge by statute for commercial businesses or corporates, namely: Finland, 
Norway, Scotland, Sweden, and Russia.203
Generally, a floating charge is a charge on all the assets of the company, 
but it does not prevent the company from disposing its assets in the ordinary 
course of business. As regards the English floating charge, the debtor can deal 
with the property in the ordinary course of business until the charge crystallizes 
on a default.204 It allows the debtor to collect his recivables and use the cash. The 
debtor can sell goods without any consent of the creditor, and the purchaser 
is free of the charge. The English floating charge covers the future property. 
Accordingly, there is no need to identify and mortgage each asset when it 
comes into existence. The English floating charge becomes a fixed charge on 
enforcement ("crystallization") and it is enforceable by the appointment of a 
"receiver", who is a possessory manager entitled to operate the entire assets 
subject to the charge. Hence, the business can be operated as a whole for the 
creditor. Moreover, the business can be sold as a whole. Accordingly, its 
value can escape being diminished by a piecemeal sale of individual assets or 
by a time-consuming public auction.205 It is quite easy to see that the English 
type of floating charge might effectively serve the realization purpose and 
the taking over purpose of a security in project financing.
The Finnish floating charge (yrityskiinnitys) shares some characteristics 
with the English floating charge. Taking the Finnish floating charge as another 
example, it covers, primarily, the current assets of a company, i.e. financial 
assets, inventories and fixed assets, including patent and other industrial rights, 
but excluding land. According to the relevant act (yrityskiinnityslaki), a floating 
charge does not cover any assets which may be charged other than under the 
floating charge. Thus, a floating charge cannot, normally, be created over land, 
vessels, aircraft and certain vehicles, since such assets can be otherwise
203See Wood, Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees, 15 and 16. 
204 F.H. Lawson and Bernard Rudden, The Law of Property, 201 (2nd ed.1982); Wood, 
Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees, 12. 
205As to the main characteristics of the English floating charge, see Wood, Comparative Law 
of Security and Guarantees, 12. 
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charged.206 It is possible, that in certain circumstances buildings, which are 
situated on land not owned by the chargor or held by him as lessee, are covered 
by a floating charge. Any new current assets received by the company will 
automatically come under the cover of the Finnish floating charge.207
As mentioned above, the Finnish floating charge does not cover all the 
debtor's assets. It is not enforceable by the appointment of a receiver. 
Compared to the English floating charge, the security given to the lender by the 
Finnish floating charge is much weaker, both in terms of the realization and in 
taking-over purposes of a security.
7.6.3. Assignment of sales proceeds under long term sales contracts
The most widely used security device in international project financing is an 
assignment of the hard currency proceeds of the project company, derived from 
the long term sales contracts covering the project's output.208 If the purchaser's 
payment obligation under the contract is unconditional, as it is under a 
take-or-pay contract, then the security created by the assignment of the proceeds 
under that contract will be a valuable and crucial part of the financing 
arrangement. The combination of unconditional payment obligation in the 
take-or-pay contract and the assignment of sales receivables209 under it by way 
of security to the project lenders forms a unique type of security arrangement 
having some characteristics of both personal security and real security.
The assignment of sales receivables by way of security has the effect of 
creating security interest in favor of the lenders in the receivables under the 
long term sales contracts. When perfected, the security interest thus created 
should give the lenders a prior legal right to the project's revenues.210 The
206 Ilmari Ojanen and Juhani Sutinen, Yrityskiinnitys, 41 et seq. (2nd  ed.  1991).                           
208 Rendell and Niehuss, 42. 
209 Generally, the legal nature of the assignment of receivables under a sales contract may be, 
e.g.  1) assignment of receivables for collection, i.e. the so-called inkasso-transfer of
receivables, 2) sale of receivables, 3) assignment of receivables for debt repayment (datio in 
solutum), and 4) assignment of receivables by way of security. As to the legal nature of the 
assignment transaction concerning receivables under a contract, see Jarno Tepora, Factoring 
sivullissuojan näkokulmasta, in Juhlajulkaisu Matti Ylöstalo 1917-4/2-1987, 423-426 
(1987). 
210 Rendell and Niehuss, 42. 
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security arrangement concerning the project company's export receivables 
involves the following basic elements: 1) the long-term export sales contract 
(ideally a take-or-pay contract discussed above), 2) the actual assignment 
transaction, and 3) the trust account arrangement securing the funds to 
received from the purchasers under the long term sales contracts, for the benefit 
of the secured lenders and keeping them outside the jurisdiction of the 
borrowing project company's host country. This type of security arrangement 
often requires an irrevocable approval from the exchange authorities (central 
bank) in the project company's host country.211
The assignment transaction involves the assignment agreement between 
the assignor (project company) and the assignee (project lenders or a trust 
appointed by them), and, in many jurisdictions, a notification to the debtor 
(purchaser under the long term sales contract) of the assignment. To be 
effective in securing the debt, the assignment has to be enforceable, not only 
against the principal debtor (project company) and the account debtor 
(purchaser), but also against third parties. The formality requirements of the 
assignment which have to be fullfilled may vary considerably under the laws 
of different jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions there are no formalities at all, 
some require an assignment agreement in writing and notification for, or 
acceptance by, the account debtor, and some require registration of the 
assignment.212
As the assignment is the instrument which creates the security interest in 
the receivables, it should be made in accordance with the relevant laws in order 
to perfect the lender's interest and thereby establish its prior position as a 
secured lender. To ensure that the security interest will be valid, effective and 
enforceable in all the relevant legal relationships, the formal requirements of 
the assignment, to be sure, should be fulfilled according to the following laws: 
1) the law of the seller's domicile, i.e. the project company's host country, 2) 
the law of the purchaser's domicile, 3) the law governing the long term sales 
contract, and 4) the law of the country in which the trust account receiving the 
sales receivables is located.213
The assignment of export proceeds is frequently combined with a trust 
account arrangement. The hard currency proceeds under the long-term export
211 See Harries, 354; Rendell and Niehuss, 42. 
212 Reinhard Welter, Collateral in International Trade, in The Law of International Trade 
Finance, Volume 6, 537-538 (Norbert Horn ed. 1989). 
213 Rendell and Niehuss, 42. See also Harries, 354. 
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contracts, pursuant to the terms of the assignment, will be paid directly into a 
trust account. Typically, the trust account will be established outside the project 
company's host country, often in a financial center like New York or 
London.214 The trust bank receives the proceeds derived from the export 
contracts and retains, accumulates and distributes the amounts required for the 
debt service to the secured lenders, and releases the balance to the project 
company, which may be bound to deliver these export earnings to its central 
bank.215
The project company is subject to the foreign exchange laws of the 
jurisdiction in which it is established. Therefore, the project company may need a 
special licence or permit from the exchange control authorities for the 
arrangement involving the assignment of export proceeds and holding of 
foreign currency accounts abroad.216 For project lenders, the holding of a 
foreign trust account is an attempt to avoid both the legal problems of 
enforcement and the political risk inherent in leaving the export proceeds of the 
project product to accumulate within the jurisdiction of the project's host 
country.217 In other words, the objective of the security arrangement concerning 
the project company's export receivables is mainly to serve the realization 
purpose and the political risk insulation purpose of the security in project 
financing.
7.6.4. Direct agreements and assignment of rights under the project 
company's commercial contracts
The overall security arrangement of project financing often involves the 
assignment of rights under the long-term supply contracts (ideally a put-or-pay 
contract made between the project company and the suppliers of energy, raw 
materials or manufactured goods) and the long-term sales contracts (ideally a 
take-or-pay contract made between the project company and the purchasers of 
the project's end-product, goods or services) to the project lenders. 218 In
214 RendellandNiehuss,43. 
215 Harries, 354.
216 Rose, 47; Harries, 354.
217 Rose, 47.
218 Clifford Chance, 59.
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addition, direct agreements may be entered into between the project lenders 
and the parties of the contracts mentioned above, i.e. suppliers under the 
long-term supply contracts and purchasers under the long-term sales 
contracts. Direct agreement may also be made between the project lenders 
and the contractor under the construction contract.219
The purpose of the direct agreement is to enable the project lenders to step 
in and substitute the project company under the commercial contracts if it 
defaults in its loan obligation.220 Direct agreement between the project lenders 
and the parties of the commercial contracts (suppliers, purchasers and 
contractors) usually contains an undertaking from the party of the commercial 
contract not to exercise any right to terminate the contract under its default 
clauses, without first giving the project lenders a prior written notice. Further, it 
contains an agreement that, if the notice was given and the lenders in turn gave 
a counternotice, then the party of the commercial contract would either:
- allow the project lenders (or an agent appointed by them) to assume the 
project company's rights and obligations under the contract for a 
specified period of time, or 
- allow the transfer of the contract to a separate company (a new project 
company) established by the project lenders for this purpose.221
The assignment of rights under the commercial agreements, in combination 
with the direct agreements, clearly represent the taking-over purpose of a 
security in the context of overall security arrangements in project financing.
7.6.5. Charge on the shares of the project company
As a part of the overall security arrangement, the shareholders may be asked to 
pledge their shares in the project company for the project lenders.222 Here, the 
purpose of the security interest is mainly to give the lenders the option of
219 See Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 32; Vinter, 88. 
220 Vinter, 88. 
221 Vinter, 89. 
222 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 52; Clifford Chance, 59; Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt 
and State Loans, 30; Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 323; Vinter, 81. 
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taking over the project if it gets into difficulties.223 The pledging of the project 
company's shares seldom serves the realization purpose of security, since the 
shares hardly have much, if any, market value in case the project company is 
insolvent and cannot perform its contractual obligations. The security on the 
project company's shares is not taken, either, for defensive purposes, since it 
does not afford the project lenders any priority right on the project assets ahead 
of the project company's other creditors.
Whether the taking-over purpose of security can be achieved by pledging 
the project company's shares for the project lenders is dependent on the 
applicable security laws in the relevant jurisdiction. The taking-over purpose 
of security may be achieved if the applicable security law confers a right of 
possession to the pledgee. This would entitle the project lenders to assume the 
rights of the shareholders on a default under the project loan agreement, and 
replace the project company's management.224 However, in those jurisdictions 
where the only remedy to a pledgee of shares is judicial sale, the taking over 
purpose of security may be difficult to achieve. This is especially the case in 
those jurisdictions which have a rule against "self-dealing", i.e. the secured 
lender selling the object of a security interest to himself or to a person 
connected with him.225
223 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 52; Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 30; 
Vinter, 81 and 91. 
224 Vinter, 81; Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 30. 
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8. PROJECT LENDER'S RIGHT TO ACCELERATE THE LOAN
The riskiness of a lender's claim may be reduced if a lender is entitled to 
effectively demand for repayment as he sees fit when the financial standing of a 
debtor is becoming worse, thus jeopardizing the debt repayment. The lender 
should be most effectively protected if it had been agreed that the loan would be 
payable "on demand". Under this kind of repayment clause, the lender can call 
for repayment for any reason. In this case, no default clause in a loan 
agreement is needed.226 In project financing, loans payable on demand rarely 
constitute the core funding for a project, because they are not sufficiently 
committed.227 Loans acquiring the permanent operating assets of a project 
company, intended for long-term use, cannot be repaid as on-demand or 
unsecured short-term loans. Rather, it is necessary to repay the financing of 
these assets over time from the profits and cash flow generated by their use. 
Acquisition of machinery or equipment for a project company is meant to 
produce cash flow with which to repay the loan over a period of time.228 This 
arrangement contemplates a loan which must be repaid over a term of years. 
Project loans are typically term bank loans. Commercial banks have become 
sources of term loans, with maturities from two to ten years for project 
financing.229 Under a repayment clause, a project term loan may be payable in 
one lump sum ("bullet repayment") or in installments of fixed or variable 
amounts.230 The typical project term loan is repaid in installments, so as to 
match the projected revenue stream of a project. Such installments may be paid 
monthly, quarterly, semiannually, or even annually.231 The repayment schedule for 
the project term loan may include a recapture clause providing that, above an 
agreed base level, some percentage of earnings of cash flow will be annually 
applied as extra principal payment, in the inverse order of scheduled maturity. 
This practise protects the lender against profits dissipated prior to the scheduled
226 Richard Youard, Default in International Loan Agreements-/, 276 The Journal of Business 
Law, July 1986. 
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term loan payments.232
The general problem with a term loan for a lender is that, if the borrower 
goes into liquidation prior to the final maturity date and if the lender relies on 
the repayment clause alone, the lender might only be able to make a contingent 
proof in the liquidation, as the principal of his loan would not yet be due for 
repayment.233 This is unacceptable to the lenders. They should be entitled to 
accelerate the loan once they conclude that the debt repayment is in jeopardy.
Therefore, as in any other creditor-debtor relationship, one of the 
objectives of project lenders, in reducing their credit risk, is to have a large 
entitlement to accelerate a loan. The project lender's right to accelerate a loan 
depends on how the events of default are determined in the project loan 
agreement. The overall purpose of a default clause is to specify the 
circumstances in which the lender can call for immediate repayment,(i.e. 
repayment before the maturity of a loan originally envisaged) of all sums 
outstanding.234
Events of default may be divided into two main categories. The first 
category encompasses the breaches of the loan agreement itself, such as failure 
to pay sums when due, failure to comply with an undertaking or inaccuracy of 
warranty. The second category encompasses the anticipatory events of default. 
These are events making it probable that it is only a matter of time before the 
borrower actually is in default under a term of the agreement itself.235
A default clause may specify even 20 or more events in which the lender 
can call for immediate repayment. However, the first event is invariably the 
same: the borrower's failure to pay a particular sum (principal, interest, or any 
other amount) when due. For lenders, the event of non-payment is an 
implication that the borrower either can not or will not pay, or that he is 
prevented from paying.236 Therefore, in this situation lenders would be 
expected to terminate the loan and use whatever remedies are available to 
recover the money. In many cases, however, this is not the principal action to 
be considered by the project lenders, for reasons to be discussed below.
232 Id.
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Altogether, events of default that typically can be found in project loan 
agreements include:237
1) non-payment 
2) failure to achieve completion of a project by a long stop date; 
3) destruction or damage to all parts or a substantial part of the project 
facilities; 
4) cessation of production for a sustained period (for example, because of 
force majeure); 
5) abandonment of the project by project sponsors; 
6) nationalization of the project facilities; 
7) a change in the law which adversely affects the project's economy; 
8) non-availability of the required insurance cover; 
9) failure by the sponsors to provide equity in accordance with the 
shareholders' agreement; and 
10) breach of covenant (covenants typically included in the project loan 
agreements are discussed separately in chapter 9 below)
In addition to the events of default listed above, project loan agreements 
frequently contain events of default clauses related to "loan-to-value" cover 
ratios. There may be a clause under which the breach of a specified cover ratio 
constitutes an event of default.238 A cover ratio is a forecast of financial 
viability of a project re-determined on a running basis, e.g. every six months. 
The main cover ratio is a financial test comparing the estimated net present 
value of the project's future proceeds to the principal of the loan, in order to 
check that the loan will be covered by the revenues and hence be paid.239
Compared to an event of non-payment, all the other events of default are 
of an anticipatory nature in the sense that, once occured, they cast a serious 
doubt on the debtor's ability to pay lenders on the next occasion when a 
specific loan sum falls due. Moreover, these events of default imply that, at the 
time of future debt repayment, the chances of sufficient assets being available
237 Vinter, 78; Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 28. 
238 Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 26; Vinter, 63. 
239 Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 26. As to various types of 
cover ratios (the project life cover ratio, the loan life cover ratio, the drawdown cover ratio, 
the repayment cover ratio, the annual debt service cover ratio), see Vinter, 63-64. 
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to enable lenders to recover the outstanding debt by legal action is in jeopardy. 
Further, lenders are concerned about whether the other competing creditors 
may have seized all the assets liable for debt repayment.240 In this light, the 
essential meaning of events of default is to serve as an early warning for the 
project lenders.
Acceleration and enforcement is an absolutely last resort and only rarely to 
be viewed as a sensible means of protecting the project lenders' capital 
invested in the project company. The argument is that banks do not halt a 
project once their money is already in it, unless the situation is totally 
irredeemable.241 In project financing, the view of the banks is that events of 
default are not to be regarded as an oppportunity to get one's money back, but 
rather as an ability to be heard in the management of the project company, if 
things should go wrong.242 If the lenders conclude that the loan is in jeopardy, 
this does not necessarily mean that an acceleration will take place. In the 
absence of sufficient assets enabling lenders to be paid in full (as it is often the 
case regarding the realization value of the project assets compared to the 
amounts of the project loans) it may be in the lenders' interest to continue in the 
operation. This, as a matter of fact, may involve re-negotiation (e.g. on re-
structuring and re-scheduling) of the existing loans. Nevertheless, from the 
lenders' point of view, such a negotiation can only be effective if the lenders 
speak from a position of strength, i.e. with the ability to accelerate immediately if 
the re-negotiations are unsuccessful.243 In  other  words,  the  purpose  of  the  
events of default clauses is to confer management control to the project lenders in 
specified cases, and to serve as monitoring devices conferring opportunities to 
renegotiate.
In addition to the right of accelerating the project loan, other sanctions 
provided in the project loan agreement to confer negotiating strength on the 
occurence of a default may include a draw-stop, i.e. allowing no further 
drawings of loan to a project company until the problem is solved. This 
sanction, however, can only be used during the pre-completion period, before 
the whole amount under the loan facility is drawn by the borrowing project 
company. The project lenders may also be permitted to freeze distributions to
240 Youard, 277. 
241 Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 28. 
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the project sponsors from the proceeds account of the project company (which 
should be controlled by project lenders). Finally, a compulsory build-up of 
retentions in the proceeds account may also be agreed upon.244
244  Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated debt and State Loans, 28. 
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9. PROJECT LENDERS' CONTRACTUAL CONTROL OVER 
OPERATIONS OF THE BORROWING PROJECT COMPANY 
AND PROJECT ASSETS
9.1. The controlling interest of project lenders
The riskiness of a creditor's claim is, in part, determined by the debtor's 
operations and actions with third parties.245 Thus, the credit risk may be 
reduced if the creditors have a right to supervise and control the debtor's 
activities and assets.
Overseeing the management and controlling the activities and business 
operations of a project company is primarily the right of the shareholders 
according to the company law under which the project company is established 
in the project's host country. However, it is also in the project lenders' interest 
to closely control the activities of the borrowing project company, thereby 
minimizing their risk. A project loan, the repayment of which depends upon the 
success of the project, should involve extensive controlling rights for the 
lenders since they assume many, or most, of the project risks with the equity 
shareholders.246 The project lenders' objective of controlling the project 
company can be achieved contractually by including various forms of 
covenants in the project loan agreement.
In broad terms, a covenant in loan agreement can be defined as an 
undertaking in which the corporate borrower agrees to maintain specified 
economic and operational factors during the term of the loan.247 Covenants 
bind the borrower in the conduct of its business during the period of 
commitment and for the duration of the loan.248 The essence of the covenant, as 
a contractual controlling and monitoring device, is that the breach of a 
covenant is frequently determined as an event of default in the loan agreement. 
The sanction of an event of default puts pressure on the management of the
245 Rapakko, 228. 
246 See Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 144. 
247 See Ministry of Trade and Industry, Finland. Report by The Covenant Working Group 20 
/1996, Covenants in Financing of Small and Medium-Sized Companies, 19 (hereinafter 
referred as "Covenant working group report"). 
248 Daniel D. Bradlow (Ed.), International Borrowing, 431 (3rd edition 1994) 
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borrowing project company to comply with the provisions in the covenants. 
Moreover, the project lenders, by threatening to invoke the remedies if the 
breach of covenant has occured, or is about to occur, can influence the 
management of the project company to make decisions beneficial for them.
Covenants can be divided into financial covenants and other covenants. 
In project financing, the financial covenants have the function of disciplining 
and directing the financial policies of the project company and its shareholders, 
thus protecting the interests of the lenders.249 The other covenants can be 
divided into affirmative covenants and protective or negative covenants. 
Affirmative covenants are promises made by the borrower to perform certain 
actions.250 The protective or negative covenants are designed to limit the 
actions and operations of the borrower.251 Both the financial covenants and the 
other covenants have the function of protecting the lenders, by determining and 
setting up certain limits to the transactions and operations of the project 
company.
9.2. The functions and objectives of various types of covenants
Certain financial covenants which have the function of preserving and testing 
the quantity of project assets and the project company's solvency, are 
frequently included in project loan agreements.252 Financial covenants include 
financial ratios which the project company is obliged to maintain. The debt 
equity ratio is one of the most typical financial covenants. It requires that 
during the term of the loan an agreed proportion, e.g., a ratio of 3:7 between 
equity and debt, has to be maintained. A high proportion of equity in the 
project company confers a better safety margin for the project lenders, thus 
protecting them in critical periods of the project.253 Financial covenants, like 
current ratio (the ratio of current assets to current liabilities) and minimum
working capital (current assets less current liabilities) requirements, are also 
frequently used to preserve the solvency and to assure the liquidity of the
249 Harries, 356. 
250 Nevitt and Fabozzi, 88. 
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253 Harries, 357. 
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project company.254
In addition to the financial covenants, there are various restrictive negative
and protective covenants which are used to preserve the asset quantity and 
solvency of the project company. They provide clear restrictions upon 
managerial decisions.255 These covenants may include:
1) Negative pledge and pari passu clause. The function of a negative 
pledge, however, may be limited, since the project lenders often have 
security on all or most of the assets of the project company.256 The legal 
nature of a negative pledge and pari passu clause is discussed in chapter 
7.2 above.
2) Restrictions on disposals of the project assets.257 This restriction 
prevents e.g. a sale of the project company's key assets on credit to an 
associated company, so that the productive assets of the project 
company are converted into a claim on a possibly worthless 
company.258
3) Restrictions on making loans.259
4) Restrictions on giving guarantees.260
5) Restrictions on borrowing. The project company's power to borrow or 
to give guarantees is frequently tied to the project and limited in 
amount.261
6) Dividend and other distribution restrictions. This restraint limits the 
amount of profits which the project company may distribute to its 
shareholders and restrains the depletion of its cash recourses. 
Restriction should also cover distributions in kind, such as reductions 
254 Id; Wood, International Loans, Bonds and Securities Regulation, 32. 
255 Bradlow, 432. 
256 Harries, 357. 
257 Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 27. 
258 See Wood, International Loans, Bonds and Securities Regulation, 42. 
259 Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt ad State Loans, 27. 
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in capital.262 Dividend restrictions in project financing usually only allow 
distributions to the shareholders if the interests of the lenders are 
adequately protected, e.g. through shareholder guarantees. 7) Preserving 
the type of business activities. Covenants in project loan agreements 
include restrictions on business activities of a project company. 
Normally, the business activities of the borrowing project company are 
limited to the construction and operation of the project.263
For monitoring of the financial standing of the borrowing project company and 
the compliance of the terms of the project loan agreements, they frequently 
contain affirmative covenants which obliges the project company to provide the 
financial information requested by the lender. This information may include 
e.g. income statements and balance sheets, annual certification by an officer 
that the project company is not in violation of the agreement's covenants and 
the auditor's report. Moreover, a covenant may require that the borrower notify 
of defaults and of potential or actual litigation.264
9.3. Sanctions and remedies for breach of covenant
Covenants in project loan agreements set up guidelines for the management of 
the borrowing project company in business decisions and transactions with the 
third parties. The threat of using the remedies for breach of covenant enables 
the project lenders to influence the management and interfere in the conduct of 
business of the project company. Breach of covenant frequently leads to 
negotiations between the lender and the borrower.265 Hence, it can be said that 
the covenants "give a contractual 'vote' to the project lenders in relation to the 
basic management of the project company".266 If the borrowing project 
company should make a transaction which contravenes the relevant covenant, 
then the management of the project company should ask for a consent for this
262 Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, 161. 
263 Harries, 357; Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 27. 
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transaction from the project lenders.267
There are several sanctions and remedies for breach of covenant. Under 
the project loan agreement, breach of covenant is an express event of default.268 
Accordingly, the project lender is entitled to accelerate the loan. It also may 
be agreed that the repayment schedule of the loan is changed or the interest rate of 
the loan is increased, in case of breach of covenant.269 Depending on the 
applicable law in the relevant jurisdiction, the project lenders may also seek an 
injunction to restrain a threatened breach. This could be especially relevant for 
the negative pledge and restriction on disposals of the project assets. However, 
the project lenders should be able to take this action before the breach has 
occured.270 Damages may also be available to the lenders for breach of 
contract.271
267 See Covenant working group report, 71. 
268 Wood, International Loans, Bonds and Securities Regulation, 33; Covenant working 
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10. CO-OPERATION AMONG PROJECT LENDERS AND 
INTER-CREDITOR AGREEMENTS
The financing of a major project often involves a number of various types of 
creditors of different types. The creditors of the project company may include 
e.g. commercial banks, project sponsors, lessors, and export credit agencies 
under separate credit agreements.272 The riskiness of a single creditor's claim is 
influenced by the competing creditors' rights and possible actions towards the 
debtor. When the financial health and the debt repayment ability of a debtor is 
becoming worse, creditors may try to do whatever they can to protect their 
position, and to obtain some advantage over other creditors.273 In project loan 
agreements the events of default clauses are especially strict, because of the 
effort by the lenders to keep control over the project.274 If an individual lender 
declares an event of default and accelerates its loan, this would set off a chain 
reaction with other lenders declaring similar defaults, under the cross-default 
clauses in their loan agreements, and taking actions to protect their collateral 
interests in the project. These kinds of actions by individual lenders may result 
in a harmful situation for all of them.275
A single creditor's risk can be reduced if the creditors can agree, for their 
common interest, on the optimal actions in using their remedies against the 
debtor. In project financing, therefore, project lenders often enter into an 
inter-creditor agreement to regulate their relationships.
Typically, an intercreditor agreement provides that no lender is permitted 
to take legal actions alone, but only in accordance with this agreement.276 An 
intercreditor agreement contains provisions regulating majority rules and 
voting procedures for the exercise of the lenders' remedies.277 An intercreditor 
agreement usually covers issues concerning the following legal actions:278
272 See e.g. Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 33. 
273 See Nevitt and Fabozzi, 53. 
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- waivers and consents to be given to the project company debtor, 
- acceleration of the loans, 
- enforcement of security, and 
- approvals on suit, execution and insolvency petitions. 
In addition, intercreditor agreements often contain a "pro rata sharing" 
provision, which provides for all the lenders to share in recoveries equally, or 
in a prescribed hierarchy, in an enforcement.279
Ideally, an intercreditor agreement should be negotiated at an early stage 
in a project financing arrangement involving a number of creditors. 
Intercreditor agreements may become difficult to negotiate after it has become 
obvious that the project being financed has ended up in difficulties.280 There is 
also another reason for negotiating an intercreditor agreement at an early stage. 
Lenders' remedies and legal actions against the project company debtor are not 
the only matters that should be coordinated. Coordination or harmonization is 
also needed for covenants, events of default, or other provisions of the separate 
loan agreements. For example, conflicting negative pledge clauses or 
conflicting financial covenants in separate loan agreements might lead the 
borrowing project company into an impossible situation.281 In order to avoid 
this, the lenders of the project company should reach common understanding 
concerning the contents of the loan agreements, before they are drafted and 
signed.
279 Vinter, 107; Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, 33                                                                                      
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11. CONCLUSIONS
In project financing arrangements, the nature of a contract as a planning
instrument and as a risk allocation instrument is crucial. A basic premise for a 
project aiming at the creation of a new cash generating economic unit is a 
careful technical and financial planning. In the implementation of a project plan 
involving many participants being dependent on each other, there is a mutual 
need for ensuring that each of them will contribute the project by performing 
within the predetermined time-schedule and the standards of the plan (i.e. at a 
right time, in right place, and in right quality and quantity). The technical and 
financial plan of a project has to be documented also in form of contracts. 
These contracts define the rights and the obligations amongst the participants of 
the project plan, and they enable the participants to invoke the courts and 
executive authorities of the relevant jurisdiction for the enforcement of the 
contracts (and the plan). The contractual framework of a project financing 
arrangement involves all the important parties contributing the implementation 
of the project, i.e. the project sponsors, the project company, the project 
lenders, the project's host state or its governmental agencies, the contractors, 
the suppliers of equipment, energy, raw materials or manufactured goods, and 
the purchasers of a project's end product. In the context of project financing the 
nature of a contract as the implementation device of a technical and financial 
plan is emphasized.
Another characteristic feature of a contract in project financing 
arrangements is its role as a risk allocation instrument. A prudent technical and 
financial planning of a project should involve a clear, complete and realistic 
analysis of the project risks, combined with an effort to allocate the identified 
risks to the parties best able and most motivated to handle them. The allocation 
of risks can be achieved through the contractual network of the project, in 
which the project risks are distributed by establishing risk-related rights and 
obligations amongst the project's participants. The contracts determine who, 
and to what extent, will bear the risks and suffer the financial losses, if the 
technical and financial plan of a project does not work in practice as predicted. 
The risks present in practically every project include completion risks, 
operational risks and market risks. The completion risks are typically borne by 
the contractors under a construction contract and contractor's bonds, and by the 
project sponsors under a completion guarantee. Some of the risks of increased 
operational costs of the project may be allocated to be borne by the suppliers 
of energy, raw material or manufactured goods under the long term 
supply-or-pay contracts. The buyers of a project's end-product may bear the 
sales market
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risk under the long term take-or-pay contracts.
The debt repayment in project financing is principally dependent on the 
sufficiency of the cash flow generated by the operation of a project. This is 
largely based on a successful implementation of the project which, in turn, is 
based on legally binding enforceable contracts. It is characteristics for project 
financing that, before the disbursement of a loan to a special purpose 
borrowing project company (charged with the construction and the operation 
of a project), the lenders generally require, as a condition precedent, all the 
contractual arrangements and material authorizations necessary for the 
construction, the operation, and the debt service of the project to be legally 
binding and enforceable. Normally, a carefully organized closing procedure 
should assure that all the participants in a project are legally bound to 
implement the project plan.
Focusing on the legal aspects from the project lenders' point of view, 
project financing is a combination of legal means and parallel contractual 
strategies aimed at achieving five essential credit risk minimization objectives, 
namely 1) an adequate external credit support and a recourse to the 
creditworthy third parties, 2) a priority right to the borrowing project 
company's assets ahead of other creditors, 3) a large entitlement to accelerate 
the loan, 4) a control over the operations, the assets, and the transactions of the 
borrowing project company, and 5) co-operation amongst the creditors for the 
elimination of an adverse exercise of legal remedies by competing creditors. 
The degree of achieving these objectives in contract negotiations depends on 
the parties' interests, their bargaining power, skills and experience.
Each of the parallel contractual strategies for the lenders protection is 
important as a part of a whole. A lack of achieving one of the credit risk 
minimization objectives increases, to some extent, the need to compensate it 
by achieving a higher degree of another objective. For example, if the 
realization value of the project assets is low, a higher degree of external credit 
support may be needed from creditworthy third parties. Further, a higher degree 
of credit risk due to the lack of recourse to the third parties and/or the lack of 
priority right to the borrowing project company's assets may, at least partly, be 
compensated with an extensive contractual control over the operations, the 
assets, and the transactions of a project company by including various 
covenants to the project loan agreement. Moreover, if a single project lender 
can not, ahead of other creditors, acquire a priority right for his claim against 
the project assets, his position as a risk-taker is improved, if it can agree with 
the other creditors on the exercise of legal remedies against the borrowing 
project   company.   Generally,   achieving   inadequately   one   
credit  risk
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minimization objective increases the importance of achieving other objectives.
Each of the contractual means of achieving credit risk minimization 
objectives involve some inherent, direct or indirect costs which may be 
substantial. The costs of various credit risk minimization techniques are 
ultimately borne by the project company and the shareholders. On the other 
hand, a higher degree of achieving risk minimization objectives should, to a 
certain extent, decrease the interest rate required by the project lenders as a 
compensation for the riskiness of their claim against the borrowing project 
company. A comparative research concerning the cost-effectiviness of various 
credit risk minimization techniques of project financing would be an important 
and interesting subject for a separate study.
The project lenders' objective to have the credit suffciently supported 
under the contracts and guarantees, which provide them an adequate recourse 
vis a vis the creditworthy third parties, can be regarded as a primary contractual 
risk minimization strategy in project financing. Like Nevitt and Fabozzi in their 
book "Project Financing" put it, " the key to a successful project financing is 
structuring the financing of a project with as little recourse as possible to the 
sponsor while at the same time providing sufficient credit support through 
guarantees or undertakings of a sponsor or third party, so that the lenders will 
be satisfied with the credit risk". In project financing, by definition, the lender 
principally looks to the cash flows of the project as the source of funds for 
repayment, and to the assets of the project as collateral for the loan. Completely 
non-recourse financings, in which the lenders exclusively look to the cash flow 
and the assets of the project, are rare. Typically, project financing falls in the 
category of limited recourse financing, in which the project lenders are 
provided with some form of external credit support from the third parties, 
predifined and limited in the financing documents.
The external credit support may take several forms providing the lenders 
direct or indirect recourse to the third parties. It may be based on direct dept
repayment securing undertakings constituting an obligation to pay directly to 
the project lenders (e.g. deficiency guarantee, contingent guarantee, loan 
purchase agreement, repurchase agreement). The external credit support may 
also be based on support agreements (e.g. investment agreements and 
commercial support agreements like take-or-pay contracts, exclusive supply 
agreements, and supply-or-pay contracts) constituting to a third party an 
obligation to pay or to perform to the project company, thus indirectly 
supporting its dept repayment capability (indirect dept repayment securing 
undertakings). Moreover, the project company's rights under the support 
agreements may be assigned to the project lenders.
361
The project lenders' priority right to project assets can be maximally 
achieved by establishing security interests on all the project assets, as far as this is 
possible under the laws of the country where the assets are located. Unlike in 
conventional secured lending, in project financing the primary purpose of a 
security is not necessarily to enable the lender to sell the asset in an event of 
default. In many cases, the purpose of security is mainly defensive, i.e. to
prevent other creditors from acquiring property rights in priority to the project 
lenders, thus aiming at eliminating possible disruptive actions against the 
project company. Moreover, in project financing the purpose of security 
arrangements may be to enable the lenders to take over the project and to sell it 
as a going concern. Finally, arrangements involving assignment of export 
proceeds by way of security, and the use of foreign escrow accounts to receive 
those proceeds, may serve the purpose of insulating political risks.
In order to reduce the credit risk, the lenders should be able to get back 
their loan investment, if the prospects for the dept repayment are endangered 
in the future. Accordingly, one of the credit risk minimization objectives for the 
project lenders is to have a large entitlement to accelerate the loan. This can 
be accomplished by including into the project loan agreement various events 
of defaults, specifying the circumstances in which the project lenders can call 
for repayment of the loan. The project loans are advanced to the borrowing 
project company for the purpose of construction of project facilities and the 
acquisition of the assets, e.g. machinery and equipment meant for producing 
the cash flow with which to repay the loan over a term of years. In case the 
borrowing project company is in default, and the realization value of the 
project assets and the guarantees given to the project lenders do not cover the 
outstanding loan amounts, it may be in the project lenders' interest not to call 
for immediate repayment. Obviously, the acceleration might cause the 
liquidation of the project company and thereby close down the cash flow 
producing operation of the project. Therefore, it may be in the project lenders' 
interest to allow the project company to continue the operation. In this 
situation, a large entitlement to accelerate the project loan is primarily a 
contractual method for conferring the project lenders a strong position to 
negotiate on re-structuring and re-scheduling of the loan, and to influence the 
project company's management and operations. Here, the right to accelerate 
serves the same function as covenants in the project loan agreement. Breach of 
covenants frequently constitutes an event of default.
The covenants permit the lenders to control and to influence the future 
conduct of the borrower in a manner that will reduce the risk that the loan will 
not be repaid. Generally, the need for policy and business controls increases
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according to the degree of the risk undertaken by the lender. A project loan, the 
return of which depends upon the success of the project, should be supported 
by extencive contractual controls since the project lenders, initially, assume the 
same risks as the shareholders of the borrowing project company. The 
covenants bind the borrower in the conduct of its business during the period of 
the commitment and for the duration of the loan, and, in the case of negative
(restrictive) covenants, provide clear restrictions upon managerial decisions. 
The covenants accomplish the objective of controlling the borrowing project 
companys's operations, assets, and transactions with the third parties in several 
ways: e.g. by preventing the borrower from preferring other creditors (the 
negative pledge), by restricting excessive leveraging (restrictions on debts), by 
preserving and testing the quantity of assets in the borrowing company 
(restrictions on dividends and financial ratios). In devising financial covenants 
for the foreign project company, the lenders should take into account the 
foreign accounting principles applicable to the borrower. The covenants 
frequently include an agreement on the borrower supplying financial and other 
information, so that the lender can monitor the condition of the borrower and 
take the most reasonable corrective action as early as possible. Breach of 
covenant serves as a warning signal of difficulties. If a violation of covenant is 
necessary for conducting the business of a project company, a waiver for this 
should be asked from the project lenders. In other cases the breach of covenant 
should provide a wide range of possible reaction alternatives to the project 
lender, including re-negotiations on the terms of the loan, requirement of 
additional guarantees from the project sponsors or charges to project assets, 
refusal to make additional loan advances, and acceleration of the loan.
However, if all the creditors of the borrowing project company have 
entered into an inter-creditor agreement, no lender is permitted to take legal 
actions individually under its separate loan agreement. An inter-creditor 
agreement serves the credit risk minimization objective of eliminating the 
possible adverse exercise of legal remedies by individual lenders. It typically 
contains provisions on voting procedures concerning legal actions like 
acceleration of the loans, enforcement of security, and approvals on suit, 
execution and insolvency petitions.
The use of several contractual strategies for the lenders' protection often 
makes the contractual network of a project financing very complex. In addition, 
there may be many applicable national laws involved, since parties of an 
international project financing arrangement are in many instances free to 
choose the most expedient law for governing their contractual relationship. 
However, the success of a project is very much dependent on the legal
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framework of the project's host country. To be feasible, both the project and 
the project financing require a rather well developed legal infrastructure, based 
on individual property rights, free contracting and generally a legal system akin 
to western standards. Despite of its complexity, project financing has proved 
to be an increasingly appealing method for financing economic development, 
especially in the Central and Eastern European countries as well as in 
South-East Asia. This fact is primarily based on the continuing requirements 
for infrastructure development combined with privatization. In recent years 
project financing has experienced a boom in demand.
